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The Dismantling of
McDonnell Douglas v. Green:





The broad, overriding interest, shared by employer, employee, and consumer, is
efficient and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair and racially neutral
employment and personnel decisions. In the implementation of such decisions, it
is abundantly clear that Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or other-
wise.'
Twenty years have passed since the Supreme Court enunciated this
worthy goal of employment discrimination law. The struggle for equality
in our society is nowhere more evident than in the workplace. The
workplace has become the battleground in the struggle for civil rights
and equal opportunity.
The obvious barriers to discrimination-"No Blacks Need Apply"-are
memories. Remaining behind, though, are complex barriers far more
difficult to identify. In the American workplace of the 1990s, racism and
even sexism in their more overt forms have largely faded, but subtle,
even unconscious vestiges of prejudice persist.
While courts grapple with the subtleties of evidentiary proof of dis-
crimination, the common and increasing refrain from employers is that
they are often unable to accomplish legitimate workplace objectives,
* Associate Professor of Law, Baylor University School of Law; B.J,, 1982, Uni-
versity of Texas; J.D., 1985, Baylor University School of Law. Professor Essary teach-
es courses in Employment Discrimination and Employment Relations.
1. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973).
385 "
specifically, the hiring and retention of a competent workforce, due to
the fear of employment discrimination litigation. The passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991,2 with its provisions for additional remedies and jury
trials,3 has served only to exacerbate this collective angst.
Finding a balance between protecting victims of subtle prejudice on
the one hand, and overreaching into legitimate decisionmaking of busi-
ness on the other, is a Herculean task. Unfortunately, the ideal balance
between the competing interests is often forgotten by the courts and
Congress. Within the past five years, each branch has periodically pur-
sued a set political agenda on one side of the equation without regard for
the consequences to the other side, be they expressed in lost human
capital or lost global competitiveness. The political volleyball engaged in
by Congress and the United States Supreme Court illustrates the tension
between the goal of equal opportunity and the risk of the federal court
system becoming a "super-personnel board," second-guessing everyday
legitimate personnel decisions as ruses for discrimination. Congress and
the Court continue to be at odds with one another in fashioning many of
the potentially outcome determinative procedural rules governing dis-
crimination cases.' This friction reflects the divergence of the political
2. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1073 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The Act provides that in cases of intentional discrim-
ination, remedies may include compensatory and punitive damages upon a certain
capped amount which is determined by the size of the employer defendant. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981(a)(1) (Supp. I1 1991). The Act also states that in a case of intentional dis-
crimination either party may request a jury trial. Id. § 1981(c).
3. Jury trials are now available in intentional discrimination cases under Title VII
and the Americans with Disabilities Act upon demand by either party. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981(c). The new Act makes it clear that the right to a jury trial emanates from
the availability of compensatory and punitive damages. Id.
4. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was primarily a response to several decisions
made by the Supreme Court during the 1988 Term, including Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (ruling that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 does not prohibit
workplace harassment based on race); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S.
900 (1989) (holding that the statute of limitations begins running in a challenge to a
facially neutral seniority system adopted for discriminatory purposes when the system
is adopted); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (holding that plaintiffs harmed by an
affirmative action plan contained in a consent decree may bring independent lawsuits
to challenge the action); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)
(stating that plaintiffs in disparate impact cases must prove that the challenged prac-
tice does not serve the employer's legitimate interests); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228 (1989) (ruling that employers can avoid liability in mixed-motive cases
by proving that they would have taken the same action absent discriminatory motiva-
tion).
The Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat.
978 (1990), legislatively reversed the Court's decision in Public Employees Retirement
Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989), which interpreted the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act to preclude attacks on age discrimination in fringe benefits.
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preferences of the Court and Congress, which emerged as the Court
absorbed Reagan/Bush appointees and as the House and the Senate be-
came controlled by Democratic majorities.6
On June 25, 1993, the volleying reached a particularly feverish pitch in
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,' where a divided Supreme Court re-
fashioned twenty years of precedent and changed the model of proof for
the vast majority of individual intentional discrimination cases, theoreti-
cally making it more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail.7 No longer will a
Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals provides a unique
perspective on the semantics involved in the characterization of responsive civil rights
legislation:
Committee reports and articles in law reviews often speak of Congress "over-
ruling" the Supreme Court, but like many a term chosen for rhetorical rather
than analytical purposes the usage is ambiguous. Does it mean "The Supreme
Court misunderstood the statute in force when it acted"? or does it mean
"The legal rule the Supreme Court found in the existing statute is not the
rule we prefer"? The former implies that the "overruling" statute regulates
events that occurred before its enactment, for the new law ensures continu-
ing operation of a rule that has been on the books all along. The latter im-
plies prospective application, just like any other change in the law. Congress
often concludes that existing rules are inadequate and provides new ones that
it thinks superior. That the inadequacies in the existing statutes have been
revealed by judicial decisions, rather than by the plaints of lobbyists, does
not imply that a revision in the text of the United States Code is anything
other than a spanking new rule of law.
Mojica v. Gannett Co., 7 F.3d 552, 562 (7th Cir. 1993) (Easterbrook, J., concurring)
(holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not apply retroactively to employment
decisions predating the Act).
5. The civil rights animosity between the Court and Congress first began some 20
years ago as the Court shifted to the right in 1972 with the first votes of Justices
Rehnquist and Powell. By 1986, the Rehnquist Court stood far to the right of the
Warren Court and the early Burger Court. Congress, on the other hand, began to
move to the left in the early 1970s in part due to the increased activism of minority
groups. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the
Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL L. REV. 613 (1991). Eskridge
argues that civil rights statutory policy in the 1990s will depend largely on the pref-
erences of the Presidency. A more liberal President not only removes veto protection
for the Court if Congress attempts to override a decision but may also persuade Con-
gress to move even further to the left in general. Id. at 663. Other than a concerted
effort to allow gays to serve openly in the military which resulted in a dubious com-
promise, President Clinton's administration as of the date of this writing has not pro-
posed any broad-based changes in current employment discrimination legislation.
For a detailed discussion of the Rehnquist Court, see generally DAVID G. SAVAGE,
TURNING RIGHT. THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT (1992).
6. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
7. Id. at 2754-56. The Supreme Court's decision came after nine years of litiga-
plaintiff automatically prevail upon proof that the employer's proffered
reason for its action is false.8 Instead, the plaintiff must prove the ulti-
mate issue of discrimination.' The Court's decision was almost inescap-
ably predicated on one or more of three grounds: (1) the belief that bias
in the workplace is no longer prevalent; (2) the belief that frivolous dis-
crimination claims under the pre-St. Mary's model were commonplace;'
or (3) the belief that despite the merits or non-merits of claims, the fed-
eral court system is overloaded with discrimination claims and that pro-
cedural vehicles should be used to alleviate this problem."
tion, and as the case was remanded for further proceedings, the case is still unre-
solved as of the date of this Article.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. An interesting study of Rule 11 sanctions shows that the rule is used heavily
to sanction civil rights claimants:
[A] nationwide survey of Rule 11 decisions between August 1983 and Decem-
ber 1987 shows that of the 680 motions for sanctions which resulted in pub-
lished opinions, 28 percent were brought in Title VII and other civil rights
cases. Plaintiffs were targeted in 86 percent of these motions, and sanctions
were granted against them over 70 percent of the time. By comparison, on a
sample-wide basis, Rule 11 violations were found less than 58 percent of the
time. The next largest category of litigation, securities fraud and RICO cases,
accounted for 15.2 percent of these Rule 11 motions. Plaintiffs were targeted
84 percent of the time, but sanctions resulted in only 45.5 percent of the
cases.
ROBERT L. CARTER, Thirty-Five Years Later: New Perspectives on Brown, in RACE IN
AMERICA 83, 91 (Herbert Hill & James E. Jones, Jr. eds., 1993) (citations omitted) (cit-
ing Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 200-01 (1988)).
No empirical studies have analyzed whether the disproportionate sanctioning of civil
rights claimants results from a disproportionate amount of frivolous claims or whether
the sanctioning occurs because of the general inhospitability of the courts to civil
rights claims.
The alleged frivolity of discrimination claims was brought pointedly to the atten-
tion of the Supreme Court in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
An amicus brief filed with the Court states that the former model of proof allowed
plaintiffs to "roll the dice" with the jury, thus encouraging "more unmeritorious law-
suits, unnecessarily diverting valuable personnel and capital resources from improving
productivity to dealing with unwarranted litigation." Brief of the National Association of
Manufacturers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, at LEXIS 74-75, St. Mary's
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993) (No. 92-602).
Likewise, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America filed an
amicus brief which stated that "[tihe federal antidiscrimination laws were not designed
to provide a forum for disgruntled employees to voice their objections over legitimate
employment practices." Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of United States as Amicus
Curiae in Support of the Petitioners, at LEXiS 44 n.5, St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,
113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993) (No. 92-602). The Chamber's brief concluded that the "pretext-
only" view (ultimately rejected by the majority in St. Mary's) would "lead to far more
trials, far higher settlement costs, and far higher defense costs." Id. at 47.
11. Several amicus briefs filed with the Court supported the pretext-plus view in
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St. Mary's cuts deeply across the panoply of discrimination laws in
that while St. Mary's is a Title VIIF2 case, its model of proof will likely
apply to individual circumstantial discrimination cases brought under
Section 1983,"3 Section 1981,4 the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act,"6 and the Americans with Disabilities Act."6 Further, because juries
large part to facilitate the use of summary judgment by the employer to rid the fed-
eral courts of an increasing backlog of discrimination cases. For example, in support
of the pretext-plus view, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States argued:
By eliminating the use of summary judgment as a just and speedy meth-
od of adjudicating claims, the [pretext-only view of the lower court] wiln
undoubtedly contribute to the flood of discrimination claims in the federal
court system. As of September 30, 1992, there were 10,771 private employ-
ment-related civil rights actions pending in the federal courts. In 1991, there
were only 8,370 such cases pending in the federal court system. This repre-
sents an increase of 28.7% over a one-year period. Without the benefit of
summary judgment motions to help reduce this backlog, the federal court
system's caseload will continue to grow at incremental rates.
Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support
of the Petitioners, at LEXIs 47, St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993)
(No. 92-602) (citations omitted) (citing Report of the Office of the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts, Table C-2A (Sept. 30, 1988 through Sept. 30 1992)).
Another- amicus brief suggested yet a fourth policy factor which may have, in
part, swayed the majority to .reformulate the McDonnell model: the inability of employ-
ers to make critical and subjective evaluations of employees due to the fear of being
embroiled in discrimination litigation. See Brief of the National Association of Manu-
facturers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, at LExis 75-76, St. Mary's Honor
Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993) (No. 92-602) (citing Charles A. Brake, Jr., Lim-
iting the Right to Terminate at Will--Have the Courts Forgotten the Employer? 35
VAND. L. REv. 201, 229-30 (1982)).
12. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights of
its own but provides a private cause of action against someone acting "under color
of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any State," who deprives the
claimant of a constitutional right. Id.; see also Pilditch v. Board of Educ., 3 F.3d 1113
(7th Cir. 1993). Plaintiffs often raise § 1983 claims in conjunction with Title VII
claims because § 1983 does not require claimants to exhaust state or local adminis-
trative remedies, may offer a longer statute of limitations, allows for jury trials, and
provides for punitive damages. Id. But see Day v. Wayne County Bd. of Auditors, 749
F.2d 1199, 1204 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that a plaintiff cannot use § 1983 to gain
perceived advantages not available to a Title VII claimant). A plaintiff may also
conjunctively plead § 1983 if some law other than Title VII is the source of the right
alleged to have been denied. See Johnston v. Harris County Flood Control Dist., 869
F.2d 1565, 1575-76 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1019 (1989).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
15. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186 (1989) (applying
are now available in intentional discrimination cases under all of these
statutes, lower courts must carefully craft jury questions and instructions
to comport with the majority holding.
The volleying between the Court and Congress continued when, only
one month after the decision was issued, the House introduced a bill en-
titled the "Employment Discrimination Evidentiary Amendment Act of
1993," H.R. 2787, which sought to override the majority's holding. No par-
allel Senate bill has been introduced as of yet, and the House bill, seven
months after its introduction, is still in its initial form. The proposed leg-
islation not only fails to resolve the evidentiary issues resulting from St.
Mary's, but creates questions of its own.
Many important statutory interpretation issues remain to be decided
under the inartful and vaguely-worded Civil Rights Act of 1991, an act
which is the embodiment of political compromise and scant, contradicto-
ry legislative history. 7 Many of these issues are already winding their
way through the federal courts, and most will be decided in the next ten
years.'" One such issue is whether the Court's rancorous 5-4 decision in
framework to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Richmond v. Board of Regents of Univ.
of Minnesota, 957 F.2d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 1992) (ruling that the burden of establishing
a prima face case of discrimination is the same under Title VII, § 1981, § 1983, or
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act). The plaintiff in St. Mary's brought suit
under both Title VII and § 1983, and the Eighth Circuit cited Richmond in holding
that the same proof structure applied to both causes of action. Hicks v. St. Mary's
Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 490-91 (8th Cir. 1992).
However, the Supreme Court in St. Mary's did not definitively resolve whether
§ 1983 utilizes the same model of proof as does Title VII in an intentional discrimina-
tion case. The Court stated:
The Court of Appeals held that the purposeful-discrimination element of
respondent's § 1983 claim against petitioner Long is the same as the purpose-
ful-discrimination element of his Title VII claim against petitioner St. Mary's.
Neither side challenges that proposition, and we shall assume that the
McDonnell Douglas framework is fully applicable to racial-discrimination-in-
employment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2746 n.1 (1993) (citations omitted).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12112 (Supp. I1 1991).
17. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Despite two years of debate on the Act, many important
terms were left undefined, and the Act also expresses inconsistent statutory purposes.
Further, the legislative history of the Act contains no committee hearings or reports
and only brief floor debate on the Act's final provisions, much of which clearly was
manufactured to provide legislative history in accordance with the speaker's political
preference.
18. The first issue already facing the Court is whether the Act is retroactive. The
Court granted certiorari in the consolidated cases of Harvis v. Roadway Express, Inc.,
973 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that the 1991 Act could not be applied retroac-
tively to cases which were pending when the legislation was enacted), cert. granted,
113 S. Ct. 1250 (1993), and Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 968 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1992)
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St. Mary's reflects a pro-employer bias, thus foreshadowing employer
victories on numerous issues currently being litigated under the various
anti-discrimination statutes. Clearly, many of the Court's decisions in its
notorious 1988 term impeded the abilities of plaintiffs to recover in dis-
crimination cases. 9 Critics of the Court are quick to look to these cases
and characterize the Court as having an anti-civil rights agenda without
taking into account several pro-civil rights decisions made by the Court
in recent years, including the Court's most recent pronouncement on the
law of sexual harassment.' Indeed, in affirmative action cases, the
Court has clearly distorted the rules of statutory interpretation and the
plain meaning of Title VII to generally uphold affirmative action plans.2'
(holding that the damages and jury trial provisions of the 1991 Act did not apply
retroactively), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 1250 (1993) (consolidated for argument and
argued Oct. 13, 1993).
19. See supra note 5; see also 136 CONG. REC. S1022 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990)
(statement of Sen. Metzenbaum) ("In a stunning series of 5-4 decisions announced
last spring, the new majority on the court reversed longstanding precedents and de-
nied protection to the victims of employment discrimination.")
20. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993). In Harris, the Court held
that conduct need not seriously affect an employee's psychological well-being or lead
her to suffer injury to be actionable as abusive work environment harassment. Id. at
371.
In addition, the Court recently ruled that the definition of "willful," a finding
which allows a doubling of damages under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, means "the employer either knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of
whether its conduct was prohibited by the statute." Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113
S. Ct. 1701, 1710 (1993). The Court refused to adopt more restrictive definitions
which had emerged in the lower courts. Conversely, in that same case, the Court re-
fused to infer age discrimination animus when discharge occurs to avoid the vesting
of retirement benefits which are based on years of service as opposed to the age of
employee. Id. at 1709; see also International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,
499 U.S. 187 (1991) (holding that defendant's fetal protection policy was facially dis-
criminatory and no bona fide occupational qualification defense existed to defend its
use); Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820 (1990) (ruling that state
courts have concurrent jurisdiction over Tite VII cases if a state claim is attached);
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (stating that disparate im-
pact analysis applies to subjective employment practices); Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (holding that an affirmative action plan was valid even
in the absence of prior discrimination by the employer).
21. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987). In Johnson, Justice
Stevens stated that "[t]he logic of antidiscrimination legislation requires that judicial
constructions of Title VII leave 'breathing room' for employer initiatives to benefit
members of minority groups." Id. at 645 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Scalia dis-
sented and added that "Title VII has not been repealed but actually inverted." Id. at
677 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Thus, despite the Court's apparent conservative majority in the civil
rights area, not all of the Court's recent decisions reflect an anti-civil
rights bias.
Further, the Court's complexion has begun to change with the recent
confirmation of Justice Ginsburg as Justice White's replacement. As the
first appointee by a Democratic president since 1967, her presence may
well affect the outcome of future discrimination cases, although the
sometimes conservative Justice White joined the pro-plaintiff dissent in
St. Mary's.' If the Court, in interpreting the many issues under the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, continuously rules so as to restrict a plaintiff's' abil-
ity to recover, Congress will surely intervene either in the form of yet
another Civil Rights Act or in piecemeal form as each conservative deci-
sion issues.
But while future cases remain to be decided by the Court and respon-
sive legislation remains a mere possibility, the impact of St. Mary's is
immediate.' The initial reaction of commentators was that the decision
would severely impact a plaintiffs ability to prevail in a circumstantial
case primarily because it could result in a multitude of summary judg-
ments for employer defendants.' Thus, plaintiffs would be deprived of
one of the key provisions in the Civil Rights Act of 1991: the right to a ju-
22. Justice Ginsburg's role on the Court is yet to be defined. In the 1970s, she
was at the forefront of the women's rights movement as an American Civil Liberties
Union litigator. As a federal appellate judge in the 1980s, however, her rulings often
adhered to precedent, sometimes disappointing her liberal allies.
The Court's current make-up is intriguing. Although he remained an enigma,
former Justice White often sided with the conservative wing of Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas. Justice Kennedy, while straying from
the conservative wing in 1992, appears to have drifted back towards it. Justice
O'Connor has remained a maverick, and Justice Souter has emerged a moderate.
Justices Blackmun and Stevens comprise the liberal wing.
23. Where the plaintiff alleges reverse discrimination, the anti-civil rights view actu-
ally favors the typically white plaintiff and opposes the employer.
24. The Supreme Court's holding in St. Mary's must be applied retroactively to the
thousands of pending cases pursuant to Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 113 S.
Ct. 2510 (1993).
25. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justices Increase Workers' Burden in Job-Bias
Cases, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1993, at Al ("Ruling in an important civil rights case, a
divided Supreme Court today made it harder for employees to prove they suffered
discrimination on the job."); David G. Savage, Justices Rule Fired Workers Must
Prove Bias, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 1993, at Al ("The Supreme Court revised the rules
for deciding job discrimination claims and made it harder for employees to prove
that they are victims of illegal bias .... Some job bias experts called Friday's deci-
sion a clarification of the rules, while other civil rights advocates branded it a major
change in the law. Both sides agreed, however, that it will have significant impact in
thousands of job discrimination claims.").
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ry.2' However, as this Article will argue, the majority opinion actually
provides ammunition for many plaintiffs to withstand a summary judg-
ment motion. As a result, on close examination, the decision's effect
should be less extreme than a first reading might indicate.
When read as a whole, St. Mary's is clearly designed to promote em-
ployer efficiency and to free decisionmakers from the specter and ex-
pense of discrimination litigation. The danger of the trial courts' imple-
mentation of this objective, however, is that not only frivolous claims
will be "culled" from the judicial system but that countless meritorious
claims will be lost as well. If lower courts fall to rely on the "ammuni-
tion" the majority decision gives the plaintiffs, and instead routinely base
employer summary judgments on St. Mary's, the decision may be seen
by employers as "carte blanche" to perpetuate subtle, hidden discrimina-
tion, rather than as an impetus to exercise otherwise constrained
business judgment. Another possible outcome, antithetical to Title VII
goals, is that plaintiffs' attorneys, faced with the prospect of financing
litigation with a more dubious outcome, may begin to refuse otherwise
meritorious discrimination cases with no "smoking gun" evidence at
hand. The majority's response, one would imagine, would be that the
decision encourages attorneys to simply be more selective about weeding
out frivolous claims.
The purpose of this Article is two-fold. First, this Article will examine
the potential effect of St. Mary's at the crucial pre-trial stage of litigation.
Secondly, this Article will explore the two existing models of proof in
individual disparate treatment cases particularly in light of St. Mary's.
Section I of this Article will trace the evolution of the model of proof in
circumstantial disparate treatment cases from McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green' through United States Postal Service Board of Governors v.
Aikens.' Section II of this Article will analyze St. Mary's and the vitriol-
ic interchange between the majority and the dissent. Section III will dis-
cuss the practical implications of the case and the importance of charac-
terizing evidence as "direct" so as to avoid application of the newly re-
fashioned circumstantial model. Section III will also illustrate that the
impact of St. Mary's will likely be felt most deeply by litigants at the
summary judgment stage. If a plaintiff can withstand the employer's mo-
tion for summary judgment and obtain a jury trial, the impact of St.
26. See supra note 2.
27. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
28. 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
Mary's in jury trials should be nominal. Section IV will discuss the pro-
posed legislation to override St. Mary's and the questions that it leaves
unanswered, at least in its current form.
One's initial characterization of St. Mary's largely depends upon one's
political philosophy and the degree to which one believes that subtle dis-
crimination still exists in the workplace. The ultimate characterization
and effect of the case lies in the hands of the judges who must interpret
the majority's somewhat cryptic discourse. The decision's potential con-
sequences mandate a careful analysis of the twenty-year development of
the model of proof in individual discrimination cases, the changes imple-
mented by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and an understanding of the
application of St. Mary's at the crucial pre-trial stage of litigation.
II. AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: INDIVIDUAL DISPARATE TREATMENT CASES
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in em-
ployment because of race, sex, color, religion, and national origin.' An
employer must not discriminate on these bases in hiring, firing, promo-
tion, compensation, or any other terms and conditions of employment.'
Discrimination cases fall into two broad categories: disparate impact
and disparate treatment. An important distinction between the two cate-
gories is that the former category requires no proof of motive or intent
to discriminate, while the latter category does.3' Disparate treatment
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988). Section 2000e-2(a) states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's face,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an




31. Disparate impact was recognized by the Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). Disparate impact does not concern itself with motivation.
Rather, disparate impact cases are concerned with the disproportionate result of an
employer's practices, typically some type of selection device such as an aptitude test.
The plaintiffs prima facie case consists of identifying the facially neutral practice or
device and statistically demonstrating its significant disparate impact upon the mem-
bers of the plaintiffs protected classification.
In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), the Court assigned
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cases may take the form of a class action suit but more commonly occur
when an individual files suit.' These cases generally arise when an indi-
only a burden of production to the employer to justify the challenged practice by
showing that the "practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment
goals of the employer." Id. at 659. The Court added that the practice need not be
.essential" or "indispensable" to satisfy this burden. Id. If the employer meets its
burden of production, the plaintiff might still prevail by persuading the trial court
that less discriminatory alternatives existed which were equally effective as the chal-
lenged practice. Id. at 660-61. The Court remarked that "the cost or other burdens of
the proposed alternative selection devices [were] relevant in determining whether they
would be equally as effective . . . ." Id. at 661.
Commentators for the most part were outraged at what they perceived to be an
overruling of 18 years of post-Griggs precedent holding that the employer had the
burden of proof. See, e.g., Robert Belton, The Dismantling of the Griggs Disparate
Impact Theory and the Future of Title VII: The Need for a Third Reconstruction, 8
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 223 (1990).
The Civil Rights Act of 1991, in large part a response to Wards Cove, shifted the
burden of persuasion to the employer to justify the challenged practice. Once the
complainant "demonstrates" that a particular employment practice causes a disparate
impact, the employer must "demonstrate" that the challenged practice is justified. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. 1991). The term "demonstrates" is defined to mean
"meets the burdens of production and persuasion." Id. § 2000e(m).
For a detailed discussion of Wards Cove and the effect of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 on disparate impact cases, see Kingsley R. Browne, The Civil Rights Act of
1991: A "Quota Bill," a Codification of Griggs, a Partial Return to Wards Cove, or
all of the Above? 43 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 287 (1993).
32. Unless otherwise stated in the text, when this Article refers to a disparate
treatment case, it refers to a case brought by an individual. "Systemic" disparate
treatment cases occur when a group of plaintiffs allege that differential treatment was
the employer's routine operating procedure. These are also called "pattern or
practice" cases. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324
(1977). Statistical evidence plays the key role in demonstrating that an employer has
engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination. Plaintiffs typically attempt to dem-
onstrate that theobserved representation of women or minorities in the workforce is
lower than the representation that would be expected if employment decisions were
made randomly with respect to race or sex. Most courts find that disparities of more
than two standard deviations from the mean are statistically significant.
In addition, most courts expect to see some anecdotal testimony concerning
individual instances of discrimination. See, e.g., Sheehan v. Purolator, Inc., 839 F.2d
99, 103 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 891 (1988). A few courts, however, have held
that if the statistical evidence is strong enough, anecdotal evidence is not required.
See, e.g., Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1115 (1985). Importantly, once the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case, the bur-
den of proof shifts to the defendant. The defendant employer must then prove the
falsity of the plaintiffs assumptions. For an in-depth criticism of the reliance on sta-
tistics by courts in pattern or practice cases, see Kingsley R. Browne, Statistical
Proof of Discrimination: Beyond "Damned Lies", 68 WAShi. L. REv. 477 (1993).
vidual in a protected class is treated less favorably than a similarly situat-
ed person outside that protected group. For example, a discrimination
action may result when a female is not hired for a job and the job is
given to a male of similar or lesser qualifications. In such a case, the
female applicant would not be required to provide "direct" proof of dis-
parate treatment.n Instead, the female applicant could establish intent
to discriminate by inference through the use of "circumstantial" evidence.
Indeed, the vast majority of disparate treatment cases involve the use of
inferential proof. The Supreme Court has recognized that there "will
seldom be 'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental process-
es." 4 In today's litigious environment, even an employer of minimal legal
sophistication is likely to refrain from providing a plaintiff with "smoking
gun" evidence such as "You'll never make partner because you are a
woman."' Thus, the individual plaintiff whose allegations are supported
by mere circumstantial evidence faces the difficult task of proving the
state of mind or discriminating intent of the defendant.'
In 1973, a unanimous Supreme Court established the proof structure
for these common types of discrimination cases in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green.17 The Court easily could have equated Title VII cases
On the other hand, in individual disparate treatment cases, statistical evidence is
useful, although not essential. The plaintiff may buttress his or her case by using
statistics to show that the employer routinely treats people of different classifications
differently.
33. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 717
(1983). For a more detailed discussion of the distinction between "direct" and "indi-
rect" or "circumstantial" evidence, see infra notes 220-23 and accompanying text. This
distinction is crucial as it dictates the model of proof that will govern the case and
potentially its outcome.
34. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716.
35. See, e.g., Thornbrough v. Columbus & G.R.R., 760 F.2d 633, 638 (5th Cir. 1985)
("Unless the employer is a latter-day George Washington, employment discrimination
is as difficult to prove as who chopped down the cherry tree .... Employers are
rarely so cooperative as to include a notation in the personnel file, 'fired due to
age ..... ").
36. "The law often obliges finders of fact to inquire into a person's state of
mind . . . ." Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716-17. "It is true that it is very difficult to prove
what the state of a man's mind at a particular time is, but if it can be ascertained, it
is as much a fact as anything else." Id. (quoting Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch.
Div. 459, 483 (1885)).
In addition, discrimination may also occur as a result of unconscious prejudice.
Thus, "state of mind" is not a good descriptor of the "intent" involved in such a
case. The circumstantial facts surrounding an employment decision may lead a rea-
sonable fact finder to infer "intent" even though the employer never consciously "in-
tended" to discriminate.
37. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). This same proof framework is also used in age discrim-
ination cases under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, and
in § 1983 and § 1981 cases. See Richmond v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Minneso-
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with other ordinary civil actions and simply held that in order to prevail
at trial the plaintiff would be required to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the employer intentionally discriminated.' Instead, the
Court chose to fashion a proof structure seemingly unique to Title VII.
This structure continues to bedevil lower courts and the Supreme Court
itself, as evidenced in St Mary's.
The three-part analytical framework first enunciated in McDonnell
Douglas in 1973 was later refined in 1981 in Texas Department of Com-
munity Affairs v. Burdine.' In 1983, the Court again addressed the
framework in United States Postal Service Board of Governors v.
Aikens4' but added little clarity to the model. For ten years, until the St.
Mary's decision in 1993, no major Supreme Court case addressed the
model in detail. A review of the model of proof as it stood prior to St.
Mary's is necessary to explore the ramifications of the Court's most re-
cent pronouncement and the apparent pro-business objectives the Court
sought to achieve.
A. The Prima Facie Case
In McDonnell Douglas, the Court held that a plaintiff in a circumstan-
tial individual disparate treatment case must first establish a prima facie
case of discrimination.' This prima face case creates a rebuttable pre-
ta, 957 F.2d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 1992). The same framework will likely be used in
many cases brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), the
Court stated that "the allocation of burdens . . . is intended progressively to sharpen
the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination." Id. at 255
n.8.
38. In fact, prior to McDonnell, the model of proof appeared to be simply this
general civil model. See, e.g., Frockt v. Olin Corp., 344 F. Supp. 369, 370 (S.D. Ind.
1972); Ochoa v. Monsanto Co., 335 F. Supp. 53, 59 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Andres v. South-
western Pipe, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 895, 898 (W.D. La. 1971); Dewey v. Reynolds Metals
Co., 429 F.2d 324, 328 (6th Cir. 1970). Each of the cited decisions resulted in a judg-
ment for the employer on the basis that the plaintiff did not sustain his or her bur-
den of proof.
39. The Eighth Circuit's opinion created, albeit imprecisely, the model adopted by
the Supreme Court. See Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337, 343-44 (8th
Cir. 1972). The briefs submitted to the Supreme Court, including the amici briefs,
failed to address the policy reasons for adopting a unique proof scheme.
40. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
41. 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
42. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
sumption of intentional discrimination and is a minimal burden for most
plaintiffs to achieve.' For example, in a "failure to hire" case, the fe-
male plaintiff must show that (1) she belongs to a protected group under
Title VII,' (2) she applied for and was qualified for a job for which the
employer was seeking applicants, (3) despite her qualifications, she was
rejected, and (4) after her rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications. 45 This threshold showing "eliminates the most common
nondiscriminatory reasons" for the challenged employment action: the
plaintiffs lack of qualifications or the employer's lack of an available po-
sition.'
The McDonnell Douglas Court then took an important step in its for-
mulation of a model of proof. The Court explained that the establishment
of a prima facie case creates a presumption based on circumstantial evi-
dence that the employer acted with a discriminatory motive.47 It is un-
clear why the Court deemed it necessary to create this presumption in
discrimination cases. The Court failed to adequately explain its adoption
of the proof allocation scheme. The Court merely reasoned that the
scheme was created to assure efficient and trustworthy workmanship
"through fair and facially neutral employment and personnel deci-
sions."' Subsequent opinions justified the scheme as "eliminat[ing] the
most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiffs rejection"49
and "focusing the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that plaintiff will
have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext."'" The Court lat-
43. "The burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not
onerous." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
44. In reality, every person is a member of some protected group under Title VII
as everyone has a gender and a race. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.,
427 U.S. 273 (1976) (white employees could maintain Title VII and § 1981 action for
racial discrimination when they were disciplined differently than black co-worker for
same offense).
45. McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802. The Court noted that the specific elements of the
prima facie case would vary in Title VII cases in accordance with the employment
action at issue. Id. at 802 n.2. The plaintiff must establish these elements by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence.
46. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54 & 254 n.6.
47. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The Court later confirmed in Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985) that the model does not apply to cases
where the plaintiff produces direct evidence of discrimination. Id. at 121. Thurston
involved an employer's facially discriminatory policy which constituted direct evidence
of discrimination.
48. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801.
49. See International Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44
(1977); see also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
50. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56; see also Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S.
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er stated in Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters6 that a prima facie
showing "is simply proof of actions taken by the employer from which
we infer discriminatory animus because experience has proved that in
the absence of any other explanation, it is more likely than not that
those actions were bottomed on impermissible considerations. " 2 In or-
der to assist plaintiffs who only have circumstantial evidence, the Court
was willing to assume that employers generally act with some reason and
not in a totally arbitrary manner.' Importantly, the establishment of a
presumption effectively compels an explanation from an employer. If the
trier of fact believes the plaintiffs prima facie evidence and the employer
remains silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter
judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in the case.'
Thus, despite the barebones nature of the prima facie case, if it stands
alone and unrebutted, the plaintiff will prevail.
567, 577 (1978). See generally Theodore Y. Blumoff & Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Rea-
gan Court and Title VII: A Common-Law Outlook on a Statutory Task, 69 N.C. L.
REV. 1, 73-74 (1990).
51. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
52. Id. at 579-80. In Furnco, the Court explained that it was willing to make the
presumption largely because:
We know from our experience that more often than not people do not act in
a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons, especially in a
business setting. Thus, when all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant
have been eliminated as possible reasons for the employer's actions, it is
more likely than not the employer, who we generally assume acts only with
some reason, based his decision on an impermissible consideration such as
race.
Id. at 577.
53. Id. at 577-78. If in fact an employment decision was arbitrary-that is, it oc-
curred for no reason-it would not be illegal. Perhaps the Court assumes that most
fact finders would not find credible an employer's statement that it acted arbitrarily.
Thus, the fact finder would likely infer discrimination from the lack of an explana-
tion.
54. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. The Court stated:
The phrase "prima facie case" not only may denote the establishment of a
legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption, but also may be used by courts to
describe the plaintiffs burden of producing enough evidence to permit the
trier of fact to infer the fact at issue .... McDonnell Douglas should have
made it apparent that in the Title VII context we use 'prima facie case' in
the former sense.
Id. at 254 n.7 (citing 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2494 (3d ed. 1940)).
B. Rebuttal of the Presumption
Given the consequences of remaining silent, employers seek to offer
whatever evidence is necessary in order to escape an adverse summary
judgment.' For many years after McDonnell Douglas, courts struggled
with the nature of the employer's burden once the prima facie case was
established. Simply put, the issue was whether the employer had either a
burden of production or one of persuasion. McDonnell Douglas seemed
to place a burden of persuasion on the employer, holding that once the
plaintiff has established a prima facie case "[tihe burden then must shift
to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the employee's rejection."' This "articulation" would "discharge the
[employer's] burden of proof."57 In a subsequent case, the Court again
held that the employer's burden is one of "proving that he based his em-
ployment decision on a legitimate consideration and not an illegitimate
one such as race."' Almost all of the lower courts interpreted the Su-
preme Court's use of the terms "burden of proof" and "proving" as mean-
ing that the employer has a burden of production and persuasion.
. In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,w however,
the Court expressly held that the burden of persuasion did not shift to
the defendant.' The Court reasoned that because the plaintiff utilizes
circumstantial evidence to create the presumption of discrimination, the
corresponding burden on the employer is relatively light and should not
be a burden of persuasion.' Rather, the defendant is "to rebut the pre-
sumption of discrimination by producing evidence that the plaintiff was
rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a legitimate nondiscrimina-
tory reason."2 The Court continued by stating that the defendant must
"clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the
55. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50.
56. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,. 802 (1973).
57. Id. at 803.
58. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (emphasis added). The
Court attempted, albeit imprecisely and unsuccessfully, to define "articulation" in both
Furnco and Board of Trustees of Keene State v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1978).
59. 450 U.S. 248, 257 (1981).
60. Id. at 257-58.
61. Id. at 255.
62. Id. at 254-55.
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reasons for the plaintiffs rejection."' The Court further added that the
defendant's explanation must be "clear and reasonably specific"' and
"sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated
against the plaintiff."'
If the defendant carries its burden of production, "the presumption
raised by the prima facie case is rebutted, and the factual inquiry pro-
ceeds to a new level of specificity."' Further, the "ultimate burden of
persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff."6 7 The Court
stated that "[tjhe McDonnell Douglas division of intermediate evidentiary
burdens serves to bring the litigants and the court expeditiously and fair-
ly to this ultimate question."'
Burdine's characterization of the defendant's burden as one of produc-
tion clearly is consistent with Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence.' Rule 301 unequivocally states:
[A] presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of
going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift
to such party the burden of proof in the sense of risk of nonpersuasion, which
remains through the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast."
However, even though the presumption disappears when rebutted, the
fact finder who is deciding the ultimate issue of discrimination can "con-
sider evidence previously introduced by the plaintiff to establish a prima
facie case."" In other words, while the presumption is not resurrected,
63. Id. at 255. The explanation must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for
the defendant. In other words, the employer need only produce admissible evidence
which would allow the trier of fact rationally to conclude that the employment deci-
sion had not been motivated by discriminatory animus. Id. at 255, 257. Therefore, an
articulation not admitted into evidence will not suffice. Id. at 255 n.9.
64. Id. at 258.
65. Id. at 254-55.
66. Id. at 255.
67. Id. at 253.
68. Id. at 248.
69. FED. R. EVID. 301.
70. Id.
71. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10. The Burdline Court elaborated on the potential
weight of evidence used to establish the plaintiff's prima facie case. The Court stated:
In saying that the presumption drops from the case, we do not imply that
the trier of fact no longer may consider evidence previously introduced by
the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case. A satisfactory explanation by the
defendant destroys the legally mandatory inference of discrimination arising
the evidence put on at trial by the plaintiff in the course of proving the
prima facie case retains its probative value and in fact may assist the
plaintiff in proving discrimination.
C. Pretext
Assuming that the defendant introduces evidence of a legitimate non-'
discriminatory reason, the McDonnell Douglas Court stated that the
plaintiff "must be afforded a fair opportunity to demonstrate that
petitioner's assigned reason... was a pretext or discriminatory in its
application."' Burdine stated that "this burden now merges with the ul-
timate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of
intentional discrimination."' Significantly, the Burdine Court added that
the plaintiff "may succeed in this either directly by persuading the court
that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indi-
rectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy
of credence."74 This language, clear on its face, is written in the disjunc-
tive and appeared to allow plaintiffs either of two ways to prevail: by "di-
rectly"75 proving discrimination or by proving pretext.
McDonnell Douglas stated that a plaintiffs pretext evidence could be
used to establish either that similarly situated employees were treated
differently than the plaintiff, prior treatment of the plaintiff, or statistical
evidence revealing disparities relating to the protected classification of
the plaintiff." Importantly, most individual discrimination cases turn on
the pretext issue.77 Thus, the interpretation of this stage of the model is
from the plaintiffs initial evidence. Nonetheless, this evidence and inferences
properly drawn therefrom may be considered by the trier of fact on the issue
of whether the defendant's explanation is pretextual. Indeed, there may be
some cases where the plaintiffs initial evidence, combined with effective
cross-examination of the defendant, will suffice to discredit the defendant's
explanation.
Id.
72. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973).
73. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
74. Id. (emphasis added) (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05).
75. The term "directly" is used imprecisely. It is unclear whether the term de-
scribes the nature of the evidence used to persuade the fact finder on the ultimate
issue or whether it describes proceeding "directly" to the ultimate issue of discrimina-
tion, skipping the intervening issue of pretext.
76. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05. The Court later clarified that pretext
evidence is not limited to certain types but may take a variety of forms. Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
77. See, e.g., Villanueva v. Wellesley College, 930 F.2d 124, 127 (1st Cir.) ("As the
first two elements of the McDonnell Douglas model are quite easy to meet, it is not
surprising that most cases, like this one, come to rest on the third step."), cert. de-
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crucial to the ability of plaintiffs to prevail or, conversely, for employers
to successfully defend a discrimination lawsuit.
For some ten years after McDonnell Douglas was decided, lower
courts held that, as a matter of law, a plaintiff who established that a
defendant's proffered reasons were pretextual would prevail. Burdine
was often cited by lower courts to support the rule that a finding of
pretext by the fact finder was, in itself proof of discrimination sufficient
to compel the court to enter judgment for the plaintiff.'8 The position
that proof of pretext mandates judgment for the plaintiff has been
termed the "pretext-only" view.'
Other courts, however, began to question the "pretext-only" interpreta-
tion of Burdine. A competing view of the meaning of "pretext" began to
emerge in several circuit courts during the 1980s.' This view, often re-
ferred to as "pretext-plus,"8' holds that while the plaintiff still must
prove pretext, proof of pretext does not automatically equate with proof
of discrimination.' These courts relied on language from Burdine which
nied, 112 S. Ct. 181 (1991). See generally Hannah A. Furnish, Formalistic Solutions
to Complex Problems: The Supreme Court's Analysis of Individual Disparate Treat-
ment Cases Under Title VII, 6 INDUS. REL. L.J. 353, 357-58 (1984).
78. At the time St. Mary's was decided by the Supreme Court, the "pretext-only"
position found support in decisions of the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and
District of Columbia Circuits. See, e.g., Ibrahim v. New York State Dep't of Health,
904 F.2d 161, 168 (2d Cir. 1990); Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 898-
900 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987); Thornbrough v. Colum-
bus & G. R. R., 760 F.2d 633, 639-40, 646-47 (5th Cir. 1975); Tye v. Board of Educ.,
811 F.2d 315, 320 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 924 (1987); Hicks v. St. Mary's
Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 492-93 (8th Cir. 1992) (case below); King v. Palmer, 778
F.2d 878, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1985). However, inconsistencies existed among cases within
two of these circuits. Compare Thornbrough, 760 F.2d at 633 with Bienkowski v.
American Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1503, 1508 & n.6 (5th Cir. 1988); compare Tye, 811
F.2d at 315 with Galbraith v. Northern Teleco, Inc., 944 F.2d 275, 282-83 (6th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. (1992).
79. See generally Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses:
The Fallacy of the "Pretext Plus" Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 59 (1991).
80. See id. at 81-100.
81. See id. at 71-81.
82. The First, Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits held, at least in dicta,
that proof of pretext would not in itself compel, or in some cases even allow, judg-
ment for the plaintiff. See, e.g., Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank, 985 F.2d 1113 (1st Cir.
1993); Holder v. City of Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823, 827-28 (4th Cir. 1989); Benzies v. Illi-
nois Dep't of Mental Health & Dev. Disabilities, 810 F.2d 146, 148 (7th Cir.) (dictum),
cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987); EEOC v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312, 1321 (10th
stated that "the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the
defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimina-
tion."' Thus, according to these courts, a plaintiff must be careful to
demonstrate that the employer's articulated reason was a pretext for
discrimination and not merely pretext in the generic sense. For exam-
ple, a Seventh Circuit decision held that "[lilt is easy to confuse 'pretext
for discrimination' with 'pretext' in the more common sense meaning any
fabricated explanation for an action, and to confound even this watery
use of 'pretext' with a mistake or irregularity."'
In these "pretext-plus" courts, the plaintiff not only had to negate the
employer's proffered reason but had to affirmatively demonstrate that
the true reason was discriminatory intent. The plaintiff could not prevail
simply by persuading the fact-finder judge that the employer's proffered
reasons were false. Instead, the plaintiff was required to adduce addi-
tional evidence of discrimination because a false reason could simply
be covering up some legitimate reason. For example, in the 1992 case of
EEOC v. Rasher,' the Tenth Circuit stated that "[p]roffered reasons
may be a pretext for a host of motives, both proper and improper, that
do not give rise to liability under Title VII." As a result of this reason-
ing, fact finder judges found numerous nondiscriminatory reasons lurking
behind those reasons actually proffered by the employer. These reasons
included fear of violence by a discharged employee's boyfriend, 7 nepo-
tism,' and good faith errors in business judgment.'
Cir. 1992) (dictum); Clark v. Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., 717 F.2d 525, 529 (11th
Cir. 1983).
83. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (empha-
sis added).
84. Pollard v. Rea Magnet Wire Co, Inc., 824 F.2d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1987); see also
Galbraith v. Northern Telecom, 944 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1497 (1992).
85. 986 F.2d 1312 (10th Cir. 1992).
86. Id. at 1321. The Tenth Circuit added:
Human relationships are inherently complex. Large employers must deal with
a multitude of employment decisions, involving different employees, different
supervisors, different time periods and an incredible array of facts that will
inevitably differ even among seemingly similar situations. The law does not
require, nor could it ever realistically require, employers to treat all of their
employees all of the time in all matters with absolute, antiseptic, hindsight
equality.
Id. at 1319.
87. See Galbraith, 944 F.2d at 281.
88. See Holder v. City of Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823, 827 (4th Cir. 1989).
89. See Freeman v. Package Mach. Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1341 (1st Cir. 1988).
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In the vast majority of pretext-plus cases, the defendant employer has
prevailed.' The defendant employer prevailed regardless of whether the
plaintiffs relied solely on an attempt to prove pretext" or whether the
plaintiffs introduced other credible evidence from which the trier of fact
could infer discrimination.' The requirements that a plaintiff have "addi-
tional evidence of discrimination" and negate concealed reasons proved
almost insurmountable for most plaintiffs. As a result, plaintiffs rarely
prevailed in pretext-plus jurisdictions.'
The pretext-plus courts often justified the higher burden on the plain-
tiffs by stating their concern for the ability of employers to exercise busi-
ness judgment.' The pretext-plus courts reasoned that even though an
employer's proffered reason was not credible, the employer's error in the
employment action simply was a mistake in business judgment even if
that judgment was made "arbitrarily or with ill will."' These courts
often interpreted discrimination claims as attacks on business judgment
and, therefore, refused to interfere with the subjective domain of busi-
ness. However, the pretext-plus courts never acknowledged the possibil-
ity that the "mistakes" in business judgment may not have been mistakes
at all, but rather decisions made with discriminatory intent.
The divergence between the pretext-only and pretext-plus circuits of-
ten affected the ability of similarly-situated plaintiffs to prevail. As such,
the dichotomy clearly necessitated clarification by the United
States Supreme Court.
90. See, e.g., EEOC v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312 (10th Cir. 1992); Galbraith v.
Northern Telecom, Inc., 944 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1497
(1992); Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1990);
Holder v. City of Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1989); Benzies v. Illinois Dep't of
Mental Health & Dev. Disabilities, 810 F.2d 146 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006
(1987).
91. See, e.g., Medina-Munoz, 896 F.2d at 5; Benzies, 810 F.2d at 146.
92. See, e.g., Villanueva v. Wellesley College, 930 F.2d 124 (1st Cir.), cert, denied,
112 S. Ct. 181 (1991); Galbraith, 944 F.2d at 275; Holder, 867 F.2d at 823; Sims v.
Cleland, 813 F.2d 790 (6th Cir. 1987) (defendant prevailed although plaintiff proved
that one of the proffered reasons was pretextual and introduced direct evidence of
sex-based animus). In Sims, the court arguably should have applied the motivating
factor model instead of the McDonnell Douglas model.
93. For a detailed discussion of several pretext-plus decisions, see generally
Lanctot, supra note 79.
94. See, e.g., Freeman v. Package Mach. Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1341 (1st Cir. 1988)
(stating that "the claimant needed to show more than good faith errors in an
employer's business judgment are not the stuff of ADEA transgressions").
95. Gray v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 792 F.2d 251, 255 (1st Cir. 1986).
III. THE ST. MARY'S DECISION
The Supreme Court had not issued an opinion refining the McDonnell
model since Aikens was decided in 1983. However, the clear split in the
lower courts as to the plaintiffs burden of proof led to the granting of
certiorari in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks.'
St. Mary's brought the divergent views and a seemingly narrow inquiry
squarely before the Supreme Court. Specifically, the Court addressed the
issue of whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff is mandatory when a
plaintiff proves that an employer's proffered reason for its employment
action is false. A bitterly divided Court responded in the negative. In do-
ing so, the Court furthered the debate over the nature of evidence need-
ed in a circumstantial discrimination case. Furthermore, the Court left
many questions about pretrial and trial procedure in these cases. In-
triguingly, the Court did not align itself completely with the extreme evi-
dentiary requirements of lower pretext-plus courts. Instead, the Court
fashioned its own unique version of the "pretext-plus" doctrine.
Justice Scalia wrote for the five-person majority and was joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas.
Justice Scalia stated that once a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of
discrimination, the employer must put forward evidence of reasons
which, if believed by the trier of fact, would support a finding that un-
lawful discrimination was not the reason for the challenged action.'
However, once the employer enunciates such a nondiscriminatory rea-
son, the presumption raised by the prima facie case drops out, and even
if the plaintiff proves the nondiscriminatory reason to be pretextual, the
plaintiff must still prove that race or another protected classification
motivated the challenged action." Significantly, the majority adopted its
own unique version of the pretext-plus analysis, one which should not
lead to the extreme results found in prior lower court pretext-plus opin-
ions.
Justice Souter wrote an unusually long and angry dissent and was
joined by Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens. Justice Souter argued
that the majority's burden of proof was "unfair to plaintiffs,"' "unwork-
able in practice,'"" and would reward employers for lying about their
employment decisions."0 ' Justice Souter reasoned that the majority's
framework allows the fact finder to "roam the record, searching for some
96. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
97. Id. at 2747.
98. Id. at 274748.
99. Id. at 2761.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2763.
[Vol. 21: 385, 1994] Circumstantial Evidence of Discrimination
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
nondiscriminatory explanation that the employer has not raised and that
the employee has had no fair opportunity to disprove.""° According to
Justice Souter, the majority distorted precedent and ignored the central
purpose of the McDonnell Douglas structure, which was to narrow the
factual inquiry by focusing on the non-discriminatory reasons articulated
by the employer." Despite the combative and vitriolic nature of the
opinions, Justice Scalia's statement of the underlying dispute and prior
proceedings was generally accepted by the dissent.
A. Facts and Proceedings Below
St. Mary's Honor Center is an adult halfway house operated by the
Missouri Department of Corrections and Human Resources (MDCHR).' °
Plaintiff, Melvin Hicks, an African-American, was hired as a correctional
officer at St. Mary's and was subsequently promoted to a supervisory
position."0 Thereafter, the MDCHR investigated St. Mary's in response
to complaints regarding poor maintenance, inadequate security, and oth-
er concerns at the facility."' Following this investigation, Hicks retained
his position, but Defendant Steve Long became superintendent and John
Powell became the new chief of custody and Hick's immediate super-
visor.' °7 Long and Powell are both white."°
Prior to the investigation and ensuing personnel changes, "Hicks had
enjoyed a satisfactory employment record."" 9 Soon thereafter, however,
Hicks "became the subject of repeated, and increasingly severe, disci-
plinary actions."" Hicks was later demoted from his supervisory posi-
tion to correctional officer after allegedly failing to ensure that his subor-
dinates properly logged their use of a St. Mary's vehicle. Finally, "he was
discharged for threatening Powell during an exchange of heated
words...."."
102. Id. at 2757.
103. Id. at 2761.
104. Id. at 2746.
105. Id.
106. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244 (E.D. Mo. 1991).




111. Id. The District Court opinion further detailed the factual background of the
actions against Hicks:
Hicks filed suit in federal court alleging that St. Mary's violated Title
VII and that Steve Long violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983."12 After a bench trial,
the district court found in favor of St. Mary's and Long."3 The Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded,"' and the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari."5
The district judge found that Hicks had established a prima facie case
of discrimination. The court noted that Hicks was a member of a protect-
ed group, was qualified for his supervisory position, was first demoted
1. On March 3, 1984, two white transportation officers, Ratliff and
Slinkard, submitted a written report to Captain Powell about violations of in-
stitutional rules by employees under plaintiffs supervision. Hicks was sus-
pended for five days, while the officers committing the infractions were not
disciplined. Powell testified that it was his policy to discipline only the shift
commander for violations occurring during his shift.
2. On March 19, 1984, Hicks permitted two correctional officers to use
a St. Mary's vehicle for an emergency. Neither the officer nor the control
center office logged the use of the car despite a rule requiring the logging.
-They were not disciplined, but Hicks was demoted-not for authorizing the
use of the vehicle, but for failing to insure it was logged. The officers failing
to log the use were not disciplined.
3. On March 21, 1984, two inmates were involved in a brawl in which
one inmate was injured. Hicks directed the officer who took the injured in-
mate to the hospital to write a report. On March 21, Hicks drafted a memo-
randum notifying Powell of the fight and injury to an inmate. Powell then
charged Hicks with failing to investigate the fight, and this led to Hick's
demotion on April 19, 1984.
When he learned of his demotion during a meeting that included Long
and Powell, Hicks was shaken and requested the rest of the day off. Long
gave him permission to leave. Powell followed Hicks and provoked him by
ordering him to open his locker so that Powell could obtain the shift
commander's manual. Hicks refused, and the two exchanged heated words.
Powell warned Hicks that his words could be perceived as a threat. This led
to a recommendation from the disciplinary board for a three-day suspension
which Long disregarded, instead recommending termination based on the
severity and accumulation of plaintiffs violations. On June 7, 1984, Hicks was
fired.
Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1246-50 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
112. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2746. Section 1983 provides a method of seeking a
federal remedy for violations of federally protected rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982). In order to state a cause of action under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that
some person, acting under color of state law, has deprived him of a federally pro-
tected right. Id.; see also Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).
When § 1983 is used as a parallel remedy with Title VII in a racial discrimina-
tion suit, the elements of the cause of action are the same under both statutes. See
Irby v. Sullivan, 737 F.2d 1418, 1431 (5th Cir. 1984).
113. Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1253.
114. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1992).
115. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 954 (1993).
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and then fired, and replaced by a white person."' St. Mary's, the defen-
dant employer, introduced evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its actions. St. Mary's asserted that Hicks was demoted and
discharged because of the severity and accumulation of violations of
institutional rules."7 However, the court found that Hicks was treated
more severely "than his co-workers who committed equally severe or
more severe violations.""" Thus, the court asserted that the plaintiff
proved pretext."'
The district judge, however, recognized the animosity that existed be-
tween Hicks and his supervisors, Long and Powell. The court stated:
It is clear that John Powell had placed plaintiff on the express track to termina-
tion. It is also clear that Powell received the aid of Ed Ratliff and Steve Long in
this endeavor. The question remains, however, whether the plaintiff's race played
a role in their campaign .... It is not clear, however, that plaintiffs race was the
motivation for the harsh discipline."
On that basis, the judge concluded that Hicks did not carry his ultimate
burden of proving "by direct evidence or inference that his unfair treat-
116. Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1249-50.
117. Id. at 1246-50.
118. Id. at 1251. The trial court noted several major differences in the manner in
which Hicks and white correctional officers were treated. For example, the court ob-
served that:
1. Hicks was the only person disciplined for violations actually commit-
ted by his subordinates.
2. A white correctional officer, Turney, cursed Hicks, his supervisor,
with highly profane language because of a poor service rating. No disciplinary
action was taken against the white officer because Powell concluded that
Turney was "merely venting justifiable frustration." Hicks, who had been de-
moted, was not allowed to vent his frustration, but instead was terminated.
3. A white female shift commander violated one of the same rules that
led to Hicks' five day suspension. No disciplinary action was taken against
her. The same commander also was not disciplined when she left two securi-
ty doors unlocked.
Id. at 1250. The district court stated that serious violations "were either disregarded or
treated much more leniently" when committed by Hicks' co-workers. Id. at 1251. For
example, Ed Ratliff, a white correctional officer, allowed an unescorted inmate to enter
a locked office where the inmate could have accessed private files or secured a
weapon. Id. The district court stated that "although the violation constituted [an] ...
obvious breach of security, Powell not only refused to discipline Ratliff but praised
him for 'diffusing a volatile situation.'" Id.
119. Id. at 1250.
120. Id. at 1251.
ment was motivated by race."2 The court further stated that "[iln es-
sence, although plaintiff has proven the existence of a crusade to termi-
nate him, he has not proven that the crusade was racially rather than
personally motivated." '2I
Justice Souter's dissent correctly points out that the district court did
not find that personal animosity, which the court "failed to recognize
might be racially motivated,"1 " was the true reason for the actions St.
Mary's took."2 Rather, the proffered reason was simply "a possibility in
explaining that Hicks had failed to prove 'that the crusade [to terminate
him] was racially rather than personally motivated.'"' 5 In other words,
the district court found that Hicks failed to prove racial motivation be-
cause an unarticulated reason could have caused the employment action.
The district court acknowledged that Hicks was not required to pres-
ent direct evidence of racial discrimination in order to prevail. 6 How-
ever, the court found that Hicks' indirect evidence in the form of statis-
tics relating to the hiring and firing of other black employees was insuffi-
cient to meet his evidentiary burden in the case.'27 Implicitly, the dis-
121. Id. at 1252.
122. Id. The district court pointed to no evidence in support of its proposition. In
fact, on cross-examination, John Powell denied that he had any difficulties with
Hicks. See Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission at 93, St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993) (No. 92-602).
Thus, the plaintiff had no reason to assume that he needed to rebut any inference
that personal animosity toward him was the possible reason for his termination.
123. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2766 (1993) (Souter, J., dissent-
ing). The district court's assertion that the discharge may have been due to
"personality conflict" instead of discrimination warrants scrutiny because the personal-
ity conflict may have masked discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Martin v. Thompson
Tractor Co., 486 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 1973). In Martin, the court stated that "[tihe ques-
tion that really becomes a very tough one for the court stems from the fact that the
words 'attitude,' 'good attitude,' or 'bad attitude,' or 'lack of cooperation' can very
easily be the label to cover and conceal racially motivated prejudices and discrim-
inations, in fact, under some other title that looks acceptable." Id. at 511-12.
It should be noted that personal conflict explanations place a heavy responsibili-
ty on the fact finder to determine whether otherwise acceptable explanations are
merely cover-ups for discrimination. Such an inquiry is largely dependent upon the
credibility of the parties.
124. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2766 (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citing
Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1252).
125. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at
1252).
126. Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1251.
127. Id. The district court stated that "Plaintiff need not prove racial motivation by
direct evidence; instead, plaintiff may offer circumstantial evidence sufficient to create
an inference of racial motivation." Id. (citing Jaurequi v. Glendale, 852 F.2d 1128,
1134 (9th Cir. 1988)).
In holding that Hicks failed to meet his burden of proving discriminatory intent,
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trict court found that the differential treatment of Hicks, while disprov-
ing St. Mary's proffered reason for its actions, did not suffice to prove
discriminatory disparate treatment.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and directed judgment
for Hicks.'" The appellate court held that Hicks was entitled to a judg-
ment as a matter of law once he proved that the defendants' proffered
reasons for the adverse employment actions were pretextual' 29 Accord-
ing to the court, when the fact finder disbelieves the defendants' explana-
tion, the defendants are in "no better position than if they had remained
silent, offering no rebuttal to an established inference that they had un-
lawfully discriminated against plaintiff on the basis of his race. " "
The Eighth Circuit held that "personal motivation" could not suffice as
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason because the defendants had never
offered any evidence to substantiate such a claim.'3 ' Thus, the plaintiffs
opportunity to prove pretext was necessarily and successfully focused
only on the reasons advanced by the defendants-the severity and accu-
mulation of violations."2 In other words, the district judge erred when
he even considered a motivation that was unarticulated by the employer.
the district court made the following factual findings:
1. In 1984, twelve blacks were terminated while only one white was terminated.
However, in 1984, Steve Long also hired thirteen blacks. Id. at 1252. Thus, the appar-
ent disproportionate firings of blacks did not support an inference of racial discrimi-
nation because the number of black employees at St. Mary's remained constant dur-
ing 1984. Id.
2. Prior to the personnel changes, one white and five blacks held supervisory
positions. Id. After Long became superintendent, four whites and two blacks held
supervisory positions. Id. The figures would have been three blacks and three whites
if the chief of custody position had been accepted by the black male to whom it
was initially offered. Id. The court did not find these numbers unusual, particularly
because the "full-scale removal of employees from supervisory positions is often re-
quired when an institution is being poorly run." Id.
3. The disciplinary review boards that reviewed Hicks' violations included black
members. Id. The court felt that although demotion was a harsh remedy for failing to
insure the logging of a vehicle, the disciplinary review board which recommended
this discipline was composed of two blacks and two whites. Id. This composition
apparently negated any inference of discriminatory treatment. Id.
128. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 493 (8th Cir. 1992).
129. Id. 970 F.2d at 487.
130. Id. at 492.
131. Id. Although the court refused to definitively rule on the issue, the court ques-
tioned whether such a "hypothetical reason based upon personal motivation even
could be stated and still be 'legitimate' and 'non-discriminatory.'" Id.
132. Id.
In the Eighth Circuit's pretext-only view, the articulation of the nondis-
criminatory reason defined the parameters of the trial.
The court relied heavily on the language of Burdine," reasoning that
the plaintiff satisfied the ultimate burden of persuasion by proving that
the defendant's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons were not the true
reasons for the adverse employment action."u According to the court,
"No additional proof of discrimination is required, " "'I and the plaintiff
was therefore "entitled to judgment as a matter of law."" On that basis,
the court stated that McDonnell Douglas, Burdine, and Aikens "make
clear that plaintiff may succeed by proving pretext."'37
B. The Majority Opinion
The five-person Supreme Court majority disagreed vehemently with the
Eighth Circuit's characterization of Supreme Court precedent. The major-
ity reversed the Eighth Circuit and explicitly held that the plaintiff was
not entitled to judgment as a matter of law when he proved that the
employer's asserted reasons for its actions were pretextual.'3 According
to the Supreme Court, proof of pretext does not equal proof of discrimi-
nation. As will be developed below, the Court unfortunately created as
many questions as it answered.
One is struck on an initial reading of the case at the majority's appar-
ent discomfort with the model and with prior Court precedent. One has
to wonder whether the initial discussions among the majority justices
and their clerks centered on how to simply dispense with the model. At
some point, though, the collective decision was made to retain the model
but to render it almost meaningless by gutting its effect. In fact, for all
practical purposes, the model of proof in circumstantial discrimination
cases has come full circle to its pre-McDonnell Douglas form which sim-
ply asks: "Did the defendant intentionally discriminate against the plain-
tiff?"
St. Mary's is not a statutory interpretation case but rather a "precedent
interpretation" case. Much of the majority's opinion is spent discrediting
the dissent's view of Court precedent. For example, the majority defen-
sively states that "[wie mean to answer the dissent's accusations in de-
tail, by examining our cases, but at the outset it is worth noting the utter
implausibility that we would ever have held what the dissent says we
133. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
134. Hicks, 970 F.2d at 493 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 492.
137. Id. at 493.
138. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2747, 2749 (1993).
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held."" Despite the "utter implausibility" of the dissent's reading of pre-
cedent, much of the majority opinion is spent, albeit reluctantly, in ex-
plaining away the language from Burdine which was relied upon by pre-
text-only courts. Justice Scalia wrote of his hesitation to scrutinize prece-
dent:
It is to [the dicta of the Court's opinions] that we now turn-begrudgingly, since
we think it generally undesirable, where holdings of the Court are not at issue, to
dissect the sentences of the United States Reports as though they were the United
States Code."
In a manner reminiscent of several decisions in the 1988 Term, the ma-
jority "reread" statements from precedent to reconstruct the procedural
framework for litigating a Title VII dispute.
1. The Effects of the Presumption Established by the Prima Facie
Case
The majority noted that Hicks did present sufficient evidence to estab-
lish the "minimal" prima facie case and that the defendants did not chal-
lenge the prima facie case.' The majority did, however, detail the ef-
fects of the presumption created by the prima facie case. Justice Scalia
wrote that "[t]o establish a 'presumption' is to say that a finding of the
predicate fact (here, the prima facie case) produces 'a required conclu-
139. Id. at 2750.
140. Id. at 2751.
141. Id. at 2747. Despite its characterization of the prima facie case as "minimal,"
the majority later paved the way, at a minimum, for employers to ask for a jury
issue on the existence of the elements of the prima facie case. The Court stated:
If the defendant has failed to sustain its burden (of production) but reason-
able minds could differ as to whether a preponderance of the evidence estab-
lishes the facts of a prima facie case, then a question of fact does remain,
which the trier of fact will be called upon to answer.
Id. at 2748. Employers may also assert the quoted language to support a motion for
summary judgment for failure to state a claim (the -prima facie case) or during trial to
support a motion for judgment as a matter of law on the same basis. It is intriguing,
in itself, that the majority felt compelled to address the sufficiency of a prima facie
case.
Previous Supreme Court cases took a lenient view toward the establishment of
the prima facie case. Typically, the only element of the prima facie case that might
create a fact issue is whether the plaintiff was qualified for the job. In § 1981 actions,
the Court has made it clear that the plaintiff does not have to prove he was better
qualified than the person actually hired for the job. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
491 U.S. 164, 187-88 (1989).
sion in the absence of explanation' (here, the finding of unlawful discrim-
ination)."'42 The role of the prima face case is to "forc[el the defendant
to come forward with some response... ." Once the presumption
fills that role, it "simply drops out of the picture."1
44
Justice Scalia stressed that while the burden of production shifts to
the defendant, "[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that
the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at
all times with the plaintiff.' 45 In this regard, the presumption of dis-
crimination arising from the prima facie case is an ordinary presumption.
As such, it operates like all presumptions arising under Rule 301 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. The majority quoted Rule 301 in its entirety:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress
or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed
the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but
does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of
nonpersuasion, which remains through the trial upon the party on whom it was
originally cast."M
The Court's analysis of the effect of the presumption did not change
prior Court opinions. Rather, the Court correctly reiterated that the
McDonnell Douglas presumption was not a unique presumption and that
it operated like all other presumptions under the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. Once rebutted, the presumption of discrimination is gone.
2. The Nature and Effect of the Defendant's Burden of Production
In order to rebut the presumption, the defendant "'must clearly set
forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence,' reasons for its
actions which, if believed by the trier of fact, would support a finding
that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment ac-
tion."'47 The employer satisfies its burden of production "by producing
evidence (whether ultimately persuasive or not) of nondiscriminatory
reasons."" In writing for the majority, Justice Scalia stated that:
In the nature of things, the determination that a defendant has met its burden of
production (and thus rebutted any legal presumption of intentional discrimination)
142. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2747 (quoting 1 DAVID W. LOUISELL & ClRISTOPIIER B.
MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 67, at 536 (1977)).
143. Id. at 2749.
144. Id. The dissent did not question this interpretation of the effect of the pre-
sumption.
145. Id. at 2747 (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
253 (1981)).
146. FED. R. EVID. 301.
147. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2747 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55)).
148. Id. at 2748.
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can involve no credibility assessment. For the burden-of-production determina-
tion necessarily precedes the credibility-assessment stage.''
Thus at the close of the defendant's evidence, the trial judge must deter-
mine whether the employer's reason, if believed by the fact finder, would
support a conclusion that discrimination did not cause the action at is-
sue. However, the judge cannot examine the credibility of the reason.
Any nondiscriminatory reason offered, if believed, will likely support a
finding of fact of no discrimination. Thus, it appears that any reason,
even a clearly manufactured one, will suffice to rebut the presumption.
Once again, as in the Court's articulation of the prima facie case, the
Court's discussion of the nature of the rebuttal evidence did not change
prior law. Rather, the Court's reinterpretation of the next stage of the
model calls into question the necessity for the existence of steps one and
two.
3. Stage Three: Pretext Redefined
According to the majority, once the employer rebuts the presumption,
the McDonnell Douglas framework is no longer relevant." The pre-
sumption, having fulfilled its role of forcing the defendant to come for-
ward with some response, "simply drops out of the picture."5 Signifi-
cantly, after the rebuttal, "the trier of fact proceeds to decide the ulti-
mate question: whether plaintiff has proven 'that the defendant intention-
ally discriminated against [him]' because of his race.""
Thus, the third prong of the model has been rewritten to adopt a form
of the "pretext-plus" view. The factfinder's rejection of the defendant's
reason does not compel judgment for the plaintiff. The majority strenu-
ously insisted that "nothing in the law would permit us to substitute for
the required finding that the employer's action was the product of unlaw-
ful discrimination, the much different (and much lesser) finding that the
employer's explanation of its action was not believable.""
As a result, the third step of the model of proof is comprised of the
larger question: Did the defendant intentionally discriminate? The deter-
mination of whether the employer's proffered reason is credible is sub-
149. Id. (emphasis added).
150. Id. at 2749.
151. Id. (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255).
152. Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).
153. Id. at 2751.
sumed within the larger question of whether the defendant intentionally
discriminated. Burdine's statement that the burden to prove the prof-
fered reason false "now merges with the ultimate burden of persuading
the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination" is
read by Justice Scalia to support his refashioning of the third prong."
The merger language does not mean that the "little fish swallows the big
one.""M Rather, Justice Scalia states that "a more reasonable reading is
that proving the employer's reason false becomes part of (and often
considerably assists) the greater enterprise of proving that the real rea-
son was intentional discrimination."'"
Importantly, and possibly the key to the ultimate effect of the case, the
Court recognized that the factfmder's disbelief of the employer's prof-
fered reasons together with the elements of the prima facie case might
suffice to show intentional discrimination."57 The Court added that
"even though (as we say here) rejection of the defendant's proffered
reasons is enough at law to sustain a finding of discrimination, there
must be a finding of discrimination."" It is in this discourse that the
Court apparently parts company with the extreme views of many lower
pretext-plus courts which never would infer discrimination from the
prima facie case and proof of falsity but would instead require additional
evidence of discriminatory animus.
Thus, for the majority of the Court, it appears that in some cases,
proof of falsity of the employer's explanation may raise an inference of
the ultimate issue of discrimination. Such an inference would permit, yet
not compel, a factual finding of discrimination. In other words, in some
cases, proof of pretext could suffice as proof of pretext of discrimina-
tion.
While vociferously defending its reading of precedent, the Supreme
Court majority struggled with reconciling other language from Burdine
with its pretext-plus view. Much of the interpretation of precedent degen-
erates into a game of semantics. For example, Burdine states that once
the employer has met its burden of production "the factual inquiry pro-
ceeds to a new level of specificity."'" Many lower courts and the dis-
sent in St. Mary's interpret this to mean that the issues are narrowed
and focused at this point, and the factual inquiry is reduced to whether
the employer's asserted reason is true or false, and if false, the defendant
loses." The St. Mary's majority, on the other hand, stated that "the
154. Id. at 2752 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 2749.
158. Id. at 2749 n.4.
159. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981).
160. St. Ma-y's, 113 S. Ct. at 2761 (Souter, J., dissenting). The dissent reiterates
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'new level of specificity' may also (as we believe) refer to the fact that
the inquiry now turns from the few generalized factors that establish a
prima facie case to the specific proofs and rebuttals of discriminatory
motivation the parties have introduced."'.' But in fact, the majority's
inquiry did not turn to the "specific" rebuttals of the defendant. By the
majority's own language, the plaintiff must "disprove all other reasons
suggested, no matter how vaguely in the record.""
This is not the only language of Burdine that the majority found prob-
lematic. The majority further struggled with the assertion that a plaintiff
may succeed "either directly by persuading the court that a discriminato-
ry reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing
that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. " "
The majority reluctantly conceded that "[we] must agree with the dissent
on this one: The words bear no other meaning but that the falsity of the
employer's explanation is alone enough to compel judgment for the
plaintiff.""u However, the Court continued that the statement renders
inexplicable Burdine's explicit reliance upon authorities setting forth the
classic law of presumptions."' The Court further reasoned that the of-
fending "dictum" could not be reconciled with other language in Burdine
such as the statement that "[tihe ultimate burden of persuading the trier
of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff
remains at all times with the plaintiff."'" As a result of these inconsis-
tencies and others cited by the Court, the majority concluded that the
Burdine dictum at issue must be "regarded as inadvertence, to the extent
that it describes disproof of the defendant's reason as a totally indepen-
dent, rather than an.auxiliary, means of proving unlawful intent."' 7
that the Court repeatedly has identified the "compelling reason for limiting the factual
issues in the final stage of a McDonnell Douglas case as 'the requirement that the
plaintiff be afforded a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext.'" Id. (Souter,
J., dissenting) (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).
161. Id. at 2752.
162. Id. at 2755-56 (emphasis added).
163. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (emphasis added). This excerpt is the seminal lan-
guage in Burdine which was relied on by many pretext-only courts.
164. St. Mary's 113 S. Ct. at 2752.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 2753 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).
167. Id.
Justice Scalia reasoned that whatever doubt was created by Burdine
was eliminated by Aikens,' which stated that "the ultimate question
[is] discrimination vel non."69 Aikens, according to Justice Scalia, cor-
rectly recognized that once the defendant satisfies its burden of produc-
tion, the fact finder must then decide not whether that evidence is credi-
ble but "whether the rejection was discriminatory within the meaning of
Title VII." 7"' "It is not enough.., to disbelieve the employer; the fact
finder must believe the plaintiffs explanation of intentional discrimina-
tion.'
71
The dissent argued that the majority's reliance on Aikens was mis-
placed, as that case quoted Burdine's language that the plaintiff may
prevail ""'indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation
is unworthy of credence. ' '"" 7M The dissent further pointed out that the
majority's reliance on Aikens was further weakened by Aikens' very next
sentence, which directs the district court to "'decide which party's expla-
nation of the employer's motivation it believed."""' The Aikens' Court
did not allow the fact finder to rule against the plaintiff based upon an
explanation which was never offered by the employer. ' 7' Nonetheless,
the majority selectively interpreted Aikens as the definitive case in sup-
port of the pretext-plus position.
C. The Consequences of the Majority Holding
The majority then devoted a significant effort to counter the dire con-
sequences which were predicted by Justice Souter's dissent. First, Justice
Scalia countered the dissent's suggestion that the majority rule was
adopted "'for the benefit of employers who have been found to have giv-
en false evidence in a court of law,' whom we 'favor' by 'exempting them
from responsibility for lies. 1 75 Justice Scalia responded that simply be-
cause an employer's proffered explanation is disbelieved does not mean
that those employers are necessarily perjurers or liars.7 ' The Court did
recognize, however, that some employers, or at least their employees,
will be lying. 7  Nonetheless, the majority stated that even if the Court
168. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
169. Id. at 714.
170. St. Mary's 113 S. Ct. at 2753 (quoting Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714-15).
171. Id. at 2754.
172. Id. at 2765 (quoting Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at
256)).
173. Id. (quoting Aikens, 460 U.S. at 256).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 2754 (quoting id. at 2762 (Souter, J., dissenting)).
176. Id.
177. Id.
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could identify the perjurers, Title VII is not a cause of action for perjury
and does not mandate judgment for plaintiffs in the case of a lie.'T8
While emotionally unappealing, the majority was procedurally correct in
recognizing that a lie need not always equal discrimination.
The majority was also undaunted by the plaintiffs suggestion that "a
defendant which unsuccessfully offers a 'phony' reason cannot logically
be in a better legal position [i.e. the position of having overcome the
presumption from the plaintiffs prima facie case] than a defendant who
remains silent, and offers no reasons at all for its conduct.""7 Justice
Scalia countered that the "books are full of procedural rules that place
the perjurer (initially at least) in a better position than the truthful liti-
gant who makes no response at all."'" For example, Justice Scalia
pointed to parties who avoid default judgments by deceitfully responding
to claims, who avoid judgment on the pleadings by untruthful denials of
critical averments in a complaint, and who avoid summary judgment by
creating an issue of fact with false affidavits.'1 In all of these situations,
including the McDonnell Douglas model, "perjury may purchase the de-
fendant a chance at the fact finder,"'" though it may create other sub-
stantial risks such as sanctions under Rules 11 and 56(g) or 18 U.S.C.
§ 1621.' " Under the majority's model, perjury does allow the rebuttal of
the presumption of discrimination arising from the prima facie case. In a
jury trial, however, if the jurors believe the employer is lying, they may
believe the lie is a coverup for discrimination.
Justice Scalia provides a less than satisfactory response to the
dissent's concern that the plaintiff is now "'saddled with the tremendous
disadvantage of having to confront, not the defined task of proving the
employer's stated reasons to be false, but the amorphous requirement of
disproving all possible nondiscriminatory reasons that a fact finder might
find lurking the record.""' Justice Scalia stated that the dissent's appre-
hension arises from a fundamental misunderstanding of the McDonnell
Douglas procedure. Justice Scalia explained that the employer's "articu-
lated reasons" do not exist apart from the record. In other words, "the
178. Id. at 2754-55.
179. Id. at 2755 (quoting Brief for Respondent Melvin Hicks at 21, St. Mary's Honor





184. Id. (quoting id. at 2762 (Souter, J., dissenting)).
defendant's 'articulated reasons' themselves are to be found 'lurking in
the record.""' The articulated reasons are simply those suggested by
the record; they need not be pled in any formal sense. A literal reading
of the majority decision suggests that the plaintiffs responsibility is to
anticipate and counter any plausible explanation which can be inferred
by the defendant's evidence. Again, however, as a practical matter, most
juries are likely to consider only reasons that are explicitly articulated by
the defendant employer.
The effect of the majority's language on St. Mary's itself, which in-
volved a district court fact finding of no discrimination, is unclear. The
district judge originally ruled against the plaintiff based on the fact that a
personality conflict might be the real explanation for the employment ac-
tion. The existence of a personality conflict was never suggested by the
defendant and, in fact, was expressly denied by a major defense wit-
ness. ' Nonetheless, because the fact finder believed that it might have
caused the action, the lower court ruled that the plaintiff failed to prove
discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.
The disposition of the case by the majority is, in itself, intriguing. The
majority did not affirm the trial court's factual finding on the ultimate
issue, but instead remanded the case for a determination of whether the
court's finding was clearly erroneous."' In turn, when it received the
case from the Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit remanded the case back
to the district court." The remand by the Eighth Circuit to the district
court included a tongue-in-cheek instruction to apply the "Supreme
Court's newly clarified analytical scheme."" Significantly, the Eighth
Circuit quoted the majority's statement that the "factfinder's disbelief of
the reasons put forward by the defendant may, together with the ele-
ments of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional dis-
crimination."" Importantly, the Eighth Circuit stated that:
[Tihe district court may decide to hold an evidentiary hearing in order to permit
the parties to present additional evidence on the now-critical question of personal
animosity. For example, Hicks may be able to demonstrate that defendants were
185. Id.
186. See Brief for Respondent Melvin Hicks at App. 46, St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v.
Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993) (No. 92-602). At trial, John Powell flatly denied any per-
sonal difficulty with Hicks. Id. Further, not one of the defendants' 41 proposed find-
ings of fact or conclusions of law alleged that any of the defendants harbored per-
sonal animus toward Hicks. Id.
187. St. Mary's 113 S. Ct. at 2756.
188. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 2 F.3d 265 (8th Cir. 1993).
189. Id. at 267.
190. Id. at 266-67 (quoting St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2749).
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not motivated by personal animosity or that defendants' personal animosity was
itself racially motivated."'
The remand keeps Hicks' chances of winning a judgment alive even
though his proof is comprised solely of his prima facie case and proof
that the reasons proffered by St. Mary's were false. The remand is logical
given the Supreme Court's recognition that an inference of discrimination
may be created by proof that the employer's proffered reason is false.
However, one must speculate that the district judge's conclusion inevi-
tably will remain the same as he presumably found nothing in the
plaintiffs proof of falsity of the employer's articulated reason from which
to infer discrimination. As for the district judge, the differential disciplin-
ary treatment of Hicks, a black man, from other white employees was
insufficient to prove discrimination. The workplace statistics regarding
blacks, which showed fairly equal racial treatment in the judge's view,
apparently negated any inference of -discrimination arising from the dif-
ferential treatment.
The district court should, as suggested by the Eighth Circuit, hold an
evidentiary hearing. Otherwise, Hicks will have no opportunity to pro-
duce evidence showing that the alleged "personality conflict,"first articu-
lated by the district court six months after trial, is unworthy of cre-
dence.' 2 Clearly, on remand, Hicks should be afforded the opportunity
to discredit this hypothesized reason.
If on remand Hicks is afforded this opportunity, he could introduce
expert testimony to establish the effects of racial stereotyping behavior
similar to the expert testimony introduced and accepted by the Supreme
Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins." In Price Waterhouse, the
Court found that employment action based on sex stereotyping was a
form of sex discrimination.' 94
D. The Dissent
In a lengthy and bitter dissent, Justice Souter stated that the majori-
ty inexplicably cast aside the McDonnell Douglas framework, thereby
rendering it meaningless.'95 The McDonnell Douglas framework, as sum-
marized in Burdine, itself stated the purpose of the framework: "progres-
191. Id. at 267.
192. St. Mary's 113 S. Ct. at 2766 (Souter, J., dissenting).
193. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
194. Id. at 235-36.
195. St. Mary's 113 S. Ct. at 2757 (Souter, J., dissenting).
sively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of inten-
tional discrimination."'" Burdine also recognized that the employer's
articulation requirement serves "to frame the factual issue with sufficient
clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demon-
strate pretext."'97 The dissent concluded that the majority's rule results
in a framing of nothing and a sharpening of nothing, rendering meaning-
less Burdine's censure that the employer's explanation "must be clear
and reasonably specific."'" Justice Souter pointed out that it is "unfair
and utterly impractical to saddle the victims of discrimination with the
burden of either producing direct evidence of discriminatory intent or
eliminating the entire universe of possible nondiscriminatory reasons for
a personnel decision."'"
Both the majority and dissent agree in their conclusion that, under the
majority's scheme, once the employer rebuts the prima facie case, the
McDonnell Douglas framework is irrelevant and the case is once again
back to addressing the ultimate issue: whether the plaintiff has proven
the intentional discrimination against him.2" Thus, concludes the dis-
sent, the majority "transforms the employer's burden of production from
a device used to provide notice and promote fairness into a misleading
and potentially useless ritual.""'
The dissent believed that the legislative purpose in adopting Title VII
will be frustrated by the majority's opinion, as some workers will be
deterred from suing because of the uncertainties of success. Those who
do file lawsuits will likely find a waste of time, effort, and money.2 "
Pretrial discovery will become more extensive as a much wider range of
facts could prove both relevant and important at trial. Likewise, trials
promise to be "tedious affairs" 3 as plaintiffs will seek to address any
conceivable explanation for the employer's actions that might be suggest-
ed by the evidence, however vague.'
Justice Scalia commented that the dissent's reading of precedent was
utterly implausible. In response, Justice Souter pointed out that the "im-
plausible" view was shared by the Solicitor General and the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission 2 charged with implementing and
196. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8 (1981).
197. Id. at 255-56.
198. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2757 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Burdine, 450 U.S.
at 258).
199. Id. at 2758 (Souter, J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 2749, 2761 (Souter, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 2761 (Souter, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 2763 (Souter, J., dissenting).
203. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
204. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 2765 (Souter, J., dissenting). Indeed, in its most recent policy guidance,
[Vol. 21: 385, 1994] Circumstantial Evidence of Discrimination
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
enforcing Title VII, and more than half of the Courts of Appeals.' Jus-
tice Souter noted that Congress had taken no action to indicate that the
Court was mistaken in McDonnell Douglas or Burdine unlike the recent
legislative response to Title VII interpretations which Congress did be-
lieve to be mistaken."7
The dissent then pointed to the primary problem of the majority's
opinion: the failure to address the practical question of how a plaintiff
without direct evidence can meet the "ultimate burden" of proving dis-
crimination.' The plaintiff no longer has the defined task of proving
the employer's stated reasons to be false but rather the "amorphous re-
quirement of disproving all possible nondiscriminatory reasons that a
fact finder might find lurking in the record. " ' The majority clearly
stated that the plaintiffs responsibility is to "disprove all other reasons
suggested, no matter how vaguely, in the record."21  One must ask
whether the majority's holding indeed nullifies the McDonnell Douglas
model. It is questionable as to whether the model should exist at all
when, at the end of stage two, the ultimate issue of discrimination is the
question to be answered. The Court in its interpretation of McDonnell
Douglas' scheme of ordering the evidence has come full circle to the
original civil model which asks: "Did the defendant intend to discrim-
inate?" The McDonnell Douglas model of proof, post-St. Mary's, offers
little more than a methodology for ordering proof at trial.
the EEOC explicitly reaffirmed the pretext-only view of the McDonnell Douglas mod-
el. See Recent Developments in Disparate Treatment Theory, EEOC Advance Policy
Guidance No. 915.002 (approved by 4-0 vote July 7, 1992), Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) 449
Issue No. 493, Part 2 (July 20, 1992).
206. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2765 (Souter, J., dissenting).
207. Id. (Souter, J.,t dissenting). Congressional inaction was cited in two Supreme
Court cases as evidence of congressional endorsement of the Court's rulings on affir-
mative action schemes. See Johnson v. Santa Clara Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 629
n.7 (1987); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 204-07 (1979). But see
Johnson, 480 U.S. at 672 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I think we should admit that vindi-
cation by congressional inaction is a canard.").
208. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2761 (Souter, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 2762 (Souter, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 2756.
IV. THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ST. MARY'S
The practical implications of the pretext-plus view adopted by the
majority will quickly be felt by the parties at the pre-trial stage of litiga-
tion. Importantly, because discrimination cases are necessarily fact-inten-
sive, plaintiff's counsel will want to request in its pleadings that a jury be
the fact finder in the case.2 ' As will be developed below, having a jury
decide the ultimate issue of discrimination will help the plaintiff avoid
the potentially negative implications of St. Mary's."'
211. The ability to obtain a jury in Title VII cases in which the cause of action
arose pre-Civil Rights Act of 1991 will be impacted by the Court's decision on the is-
sue of retroactivity. Some lower court decisions suggest that the addition of a jury
trial provision is a procedural rather than a substantive change in the law. As such,
even litigants with pre-Civil Rights Act claims should be able to amend their
pleadings to request a jury trial. See, e.g., Brown v. Amoco Oil Co., 793 F. Supp. 846,
851 (N.D. Ind. 1992).
212. The analysis in the "Practical Implications" section assumes that the lawsuit
has been filed in federal court. Increasingly, plaintiffs are filing discrimination law-
suits in state court based on state statutes parallel to Title VII. Litigating a discrimi-
nation case in state court could yield a plaintiff numerous advantages:
1. Some state courts may apply pre-St. Mary's law, particularly if state prece-
dent following the pretext only model is well-established.
2. State courts will always entertain jurisdiction over state tort claims such as
intentional infliction of mental anguish causes of action which may provide unlimited
punitive damage awards. Federal courts, on the other hand, have discretion as to
whether they will entertain supplemental (or pendant) jurisdiction over common law
state claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1993). Even if the federal court does entertain
jurisdiction over the state claims, a federal court's interpretation of relevant state law
may differ from that of state courts.
3. State summary judgment rules may make summary judgment more difficult
for the movant employer than under federal summary judgment rules. For example,
in federal court a defendant seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of
informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying the absence of
evidence to support an essential element of the plaintiffs case. See Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant plaintiff to
produce sufficient evidence to allow reasonable jurors to find "by a preponderance of
the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). On other hand, state procedural rules may make a de-
fendant movant's burden substantially greater. In Texas, for example, the defendant
cannot succeed simply by identifying an absence of evidence to support an essential
element of the plaintiffs case. Instead, the defendant must produce summary judg-
ment proof conclusively negating an essential element of the plaintiff's claim. Casso
v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 555-56 (Tex. 1989).
4. State courts may provide juries more hospitable to discrimination claims than
juries in federal courts. In many state courts, counsel, not the court, conduct voir
dire of the jury panel. In federal court, the judge usually conducts the voir dire al-
though counsel may submit prepared questions. FED. R. Civ. P. 47(a). In addition, the
demographics of the jury pool in state court may favor a plaintiff, depending on the
method and geographical locale from which the pool is drawn in a given state.
5. Some federal courts may be more inclined to reduce damage awards than




Despite the dissent's dire predictions to the contrary, a plaintiffs dis-
covery strategy post-St. Mary's should not change. If a jury is the fact
finder, a plaintiff should continue to be able to limit discovery to explor-
ing and ultimately attempting to discredit those reasons clearly articulat-
ed by the employer for the employment action. If the plaintiff success-
fully proves that the articulated reasons are false, most juries probably
will infer that the false reason is, in fact, a coverup for discrimination.
Otherwise, why wouldn't the employer simply tell the true nondiscrimina-
tory reason for the action? As such, the dissent's dire prediction that pre-
trial discovery will become more expensive for the plaintiff who now
needs to turn over every stone of possible motivation is unfounded in the
context of jury trials.
In the few cases which may be tried by the court, the dissent's predic-
tion of expanded discovery is perhaps more accurate, at least in theory.
Pre-St. Mary's cases illustrate, as discussed above, the willingness of
some trial judges to latch on to any possible nondiscriminatory reason,
however vaguely suggested in the record. Because St. Mary's mandates
that a plaintiff negate the vaguest of reasons suggested by the record,
plaintiffs counsel theoretically should try to identify and explore any
subtle motivations that a judge as fact finder might infer were possible
causes for the employment action. However, as in St. Mary's, the subtle
motivation may sometimes be so subtle that neither party anticipates it
will be relied upon by the judge until after the decision issues. As a prac-
tical matter, even with a fact-finder judge, a plaintiffs mechanical ap-
proach to discovery will probably not be any different than it was before
St. Mary's. As in the past, a plaintiffs interrogatories to the defendant
will include asking the defendant to state why the plaintiff was dis-
charged, not hired, etc. As in the past, a plaintiff will also ask the defen-
dant to identify persons with knowledge of relevant facts. As before, a
plaintiff will either interview or depose these persons to discern what
they know. These basic tenets of discovery will not change. What could
would a state court. See, e.g., Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 843 F.2d 831 (5th Cir.
1988) (reducing wrongful death award from $250,000 to $25,000).
These differences between federal and state practices, as well as many others,
may affect a plaintiffs ability to prevail in discrimination cases. As such, plaintiffs
counsel should carefully weigh the advantages of filing a discrimination action in
state court.
change is that a plaintiff's attorney might feel obligated to track down
unarticulated, but speculative, reasons for the employer's action. For
example, in some cases, this obligation could translate into the need to
take additional depositions.
In reality, however, exploring rabbit trails of unarticulated motivations
will not protect a plaintiff from a fact finder who is intent on finding no
discrimination. Thus, in both jury trials and bench trials, it is difficult to
conceive how St. Mary's will affect the traditional discovery conducted
by plaintiffs in discrimination cases."3
2. Circumstantial Evidence v. Direct Evidence: Escaping the
McDonnell Douglas Model
Importantly, at the pre-trial stage, plaintiffs counsel will want to
search for any evidence that could constitute "direct" evidence so as to
bring the plaintiff's case under the more favorable motivating factor mod-
el adopted in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.214 Regardless of whether Con-
213. If additional discovery does appear warranted, plaintiffs counsel should consid-
er that the amended Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, effective on December 1, 1993,
contain presumptive discovery limits and in some cases may affect plaintiff counsel's
ability to conduct additional discovery. For example, the amended Rules, designed to
alleviate the expense and abuse of discovery, presumptively limit parties to 10 deposi-
tions per side and 25 interrogatories per party. See FED. R. CiV. P. 30, 31, 33. These
presumptive limits will not affect most employment discrimination cases even with
the Court mandate to negate the vaguest of evidence. But in those few cases in
which the presumptive limits do pose a problem, counsel will have to engage in a
time-consuming motion practice to overcome the presumptive limits.
214. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp III. 1991). "Except as otherwise provided in this
title, an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating fac-
tor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the prac-
tice." Id. (emphasis added).
Significantly, the term "motivating factor" is left undefined by the Act. The moti-
vating factor model had its genesis in the Supreme Court's decision in Price Water-
house v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). In that plurality opinion, the Court stated that
the McDonnell Douglas model was inappropriate for cases which consist of both
illegitimate and legitimate reasons for the employer's actions. The Court stated:
In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment decision,
we mean that, if we asked the employer at the moment of the decision what
its reasons were and if we received a truthful response, one of those reasons
would be that the applicant or employee was a woman.
Id. at 250.
The Court added that proof of sex-based stereotypes can constitute proof of an
illegitimate motive and thus prove that gender was a motivating factor in the employ-
ment decision. Id.
Justice O'Connor's concurrence distinguished McDonnell Douglas, where the plain-
tiff presented no direct evidence, from such cases as Price Waterhouse, where the
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gress eventually overrides St. Mary's and the difficulties it creates for
plaintiffs, the first goal of plaintiffs counsel is to avoid application of the
McDonnell Douglas model altogether, if possible."5
Even before St. Mary's, the motivating factor model was much more
favorable for plaintiffs. Significantly, liability attaches after the plaintiff
has shown that the protected classification was a discriminatory moti-
vating factor in the employment action. At that point, the court may
grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees."' The em-
ployer then has the opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the same decision would have been made even absent the
discriminatory motive. If successful, the defendant will avoid paying any
other damages, such as compensatory and punitive damages, and back
pay.
Importantly, the type of evidence that will bring a case under the moti-
vating factor model is far from clear, leaving great latitude for advocacy.
The motivating factor test may require what is often mistakenly termed
"direct" evidence. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, however, gives absolutely
no guidance on this crucial issue. In Price Waterhouse,"7 the Supreme
Court adopted the predecessor "mixed-motive" model and. allowed sex
stereotyping to suffice as evidence which would put a case under this
plaintiff offered direct evidence. Justice O'Connor stated that without direct evidence,
there is no justification for shifting the burden of persuasion. Id. at 277 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). As a result, she would not allow stray remarks in the workplace, state-
ments by non-decisionmakers, or statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the em-
ployment decisional process to satisfy the plaintiffs burden. Id. (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring).
215. Even if Congress acts to override St. Mary's, the motivating factor model is
still much more favorable for the plaintiff.
216. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 states:
On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under § 2000e-2(m) of
this title and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would have
taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor,
the court-
(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided in
clause (ii)), and attorney's fees and costs demonstrated to be di-
rectly attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under § 2000e-2(m)
of this title; and
(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission,
reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment, described in subpara-
graph (A).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5g(2)(B) (Supp. III 1991).
217. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
pro-plaintiff model."1 8 The plurality did not label the sex stereotyping as
direct evidence but simply treated it as the type of evidence which would
invoke the "mixed motive" model."9
However, in Price Waterhouse, Justice O'Connor's concurrence stated
that "direct" evidence was necessary to invoke the new model and pre-
sumably agreed that the evidence in the case was direct.22 But in fact,
the evidence presented in Price Waterhouse was not direct evidence in
the hornbook definition sense. Direct evidence is evidence which, if be-
lieved, resolves a matter in issue. For example, a witness' testimony that
he saw A stab B is direct evidence of whether A did indeed stab B."
The evidence in Price Waterhouse consisted of statements by a
decisionmaking partner that the female plaintiff needed to "walk more
femininely, talk more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and
wear jewelry" to make partner.'s This evidence clearly is circumstantial
evidence, evidence which requires additional reasoning to reach the
proposition to which it is directed.2 ' The finder of fact is required to
infer from the partner's statement that the reason the plaintiff failed to
make partner was because the employer based his decision on impermis-
sible sexual stereotyping. Nonetheless, the. Supreme Court did not char-
acterize the evidence as circumstantial, a characterization which would
have led to application of the McDonnell Douglas model. Instead, the
Court applied the pro-plaintiff mixed-motive model, the predecessor to
the motivating factor model found in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
Cognizant of the consequences of model selection, lower courts have
had great difficulty in deciding what constitutes "direct" evidence and
218. Id. at 252.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[A] disparate treatment plaintiff must
prove by direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the
decision.") Justice O'Connor was the only Justice who required "direct" evidence, as
the plurality never mentioned it. Nonetheless, lower courts have latched onto that
word in determining the type of evidence needed to invoke the mixed-motive model.
In addition, Justice O'Connor's concurrence required a higher level of causation
than did the plurality. Justice O'Connor asserted that the illegitimate criterion must
be a "substantial factor" in the employment decision. Id. at 276 (O'Connor, J., con-
curring). On the other hand, the plurality's opinion limited its discussion to a "moti-
vating factor," suggesting a lesser quantum of causation. Id. at 250. The Civil Rights
Act of 1991 uses only "motivating factor" terminology. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5g(2)(B)
(Supp. I1 1991).
221. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 777 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed.
1992). In contrast, testimony that A fled the scene of the stabbing would be circum-
stantial evidence of the stabbing but direct evidence of the flight itself.
222. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989). This evidence, accord-
ing to the Court, was the "coup de grace." Id.
223. McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 221, at 777.
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what is "circumstantial" evidence, the latter dictating application of the
McDonnell Douglas model. Two circuit court decisions illustrate the
difficulties of model selection. Both Bruno v. City of Crown Point,' a
Seventh Circuit decision, and Barbano v. Madison County, 5 a Second
Circuit decision, dealt with evidence of interview questions asked only of
women, including how many children the women planned to have and
childcare arrangements. The Seventh Circuit evaluated the proof as indi-
rect evidence under McDonnell Douglas."6 In stark contrast, the Second
Circuit treated the tainted interview as direct evidence of sex discrimi-
nation. " As one might anticipate, the defendant employer 'prevailed in
Bruno while the plaintiff prevailed in Barbano. This illustration of incon-
sistency is only one of many. The often subtle and difficult distinction
between "direct" and "indirect" or "circumstantial" evidence has con-
founded numerous lower courts as Justice Kennedy predicted in his
dissent to Price Waterhouse.'
Some courts, in determining which model to invoke, are moving away
from the imprecise labels of "direct" and "circumstantial" and are focus-
ing instead on the probative value of the evidence. The movement away
from the often misused labels of "direct" and "circumstantial" towards an
assessment of the evidence's probative value is logical. Simply because
evidence is "circumstantial" does not mean it has inferior probative val-
ue. As one treatise states:
224. 950 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2998 (1992). The Bruno
case involved questions of sex discrimination. Although the Seventh Circuit cited
Price Waterhouse, the court never labeled the sex stereotyping questions as direct
evidence of discrimination. Instead, the court ultimately concluded that "[t]here was
no direct evidence of sex discrimination." Id. at 363.
225. 922 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1990).
226. Bruno, 950 F.2d at 363.
227. Barbano, 922 F.2d at 144-45. See generally, Tracy L. Bach, Note, Gender Ste-
reotyping in Employment Discrimination: Finding a Balance of Evidence and Cau-
sation Under Title VII, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1251, 1269-75 (1993).
228. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 291-92 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Kennedy stated that "trial courts will be saddled with the task of de-
veloping standards for determining when to apply the burden shift .... Confusion in
the application of dual burden-shifting mechanisms will be most acute in cases
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), where courts borrow the Title VII order of proof for the conduct of jury
trials." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Now that Title VII intentional discrimination cas-
es can be tried to a jury in federal court, confusion will likely reign in those trials
as well.
The distinction (between direct and circumstantial evidence) is conceptually use-
ful, but it has no direct importance in passing on the relevance of the particular
evidence. In this regard, it is worth noting that the fact that inferential value is an
issue with respect to circumstantial but not direct evidence does not imply that
the former is generally inferior. Both sorts of evidence are quite convincing on
some occasions, but not nearly so telling in other instances.'
One recent Eighth Circuit decision, Stacks v. Southwestern Bell Yellow
Pages, Inc.,' illustrates the movement away from evidence labels in
discrimination cases. In Stacks, the court stated that "if the plaintiff can
demonstrate that an illegitimate criterion was a motivating factor in the
employment decision, the burden shifting formula set out in [Price Wa-
terhouse] applies. " "3n The Eighth Circuit then stated that it uses the
term "demonstrate" advisedly "in order to avoid the 'thicket' created by
some courts' use of the term 'direct evidence' to describe the plaintiffs
initial burden of proof in a Price Waterhouse case."' The Eighth Cir-
cuit stated:
We conclude that there is no restriction on the type of evidence a plaintiff may
produce to demonstrate that an illegitimate criterion was a motivating factor in
the challenged employment decision. The plaintiff need only present evidence, be
it direct or circumstantial, sufficient to support a -finding by a reasonable
factfinder that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated the challenged deci-
sion.'
The court went on to cite evidence in a prior case consisting of a
statement made by a decisionmaker to the effect "that older employees
have problems adapting to new employment policies."' The Stacks
court recognized that "in hornbook terms, this statement constitutes
circumstantial evidence (in that it requires an inference from the state-
ment proved to the conclusion intended) that a discriminatory motive
played a motivating factor in the challenged employment decision." '
However, the Stacks court accepted this as the type of evidence that will
invoke the motivating factor model."i Significantly, the Stacks court
chastised the district court, which apparently made no effort to invoke
the motivating factor model."? The Eighth Circuit then remanded the
case back to the lower court to consider application of the motivating
229. McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 221, at 777 n.19 (citations omitted).
230. 996 F.2d 200 (8th Cir. 1993).
231. Id. at 201-02.
232. Id. at 201 n.l.
233. Id.
234. Id. (quoting Beshears v. Asbill, 930 F.2d 1348, 1354 (8th Cir. 1991)).
235. Id.
236. Id. The Court stated that "[wie believe that the term 'direct evidence,' as used
in Beshears, means only that the plaintiff must present evidence showing a specific
link between discriminatory animus and the challenged decision." Id.
237. Id. at 202.
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factor model particularly in light of the following statement from the dis-
trict judge's findings:
I think that [Hudson] may well have thought that women were the worst things
that happened to Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages and that if he had his druthers,
he wouldn't have any women there .... Yes, I have some problems with the way
Ms. Stacks' attitude was being evaluated.'
In short, if a plaintiff produces sufficient evidence, either direct or in-
ferential, from which a fact finder could conclude as a matter of fact
that the employer was motivated in part by discrimination in making an
adverse employment decision, the motivating factor model should be
used by the trial court.' In order to invoke the motivating factor mod-
el, counsel for plaintiff should look for the following types of evidence
throughout the discovery process:
1. Evidence of protected classification stereotyping;240
2. Evidence of actions or remarks of the employer that reflect a dis-
criminatory attitude;24'
3. Comments which demonstrate a discriminatory animus in the deci-
sional process or comments uttered by individuals closely involved
in employment decisions.242
These types of evidence should suffice to allow the case to be tried and
the jury issues submitted under the motivating factor model. Stray re-
marks by a non-decisionmaker will not likely suffice as direct evi-
dence.2'
If plaintiffs counsel cannot find evidence from which to argue applica-
tion of the motivating factor model, the logical step for the defendant's
counsel, as a result of St. Mary's, will be to file a motion for summary
judgment. The key player in this stage of litigation is the district judge
who must grapple with the failure of the St. Mary's majority to give clear
238. Id. at 203 (quoting Trial Tr. at 90-91).
239. See Candace S. Kovacic-Fleischer, Proving Discrimination After Price Water-
house and Wards Cove: Semantics v. Substance, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 615, 624-28
(1990).
240. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989).
241. See Stacks, 996 F.2d at 202-03.
242. Id. at 203.
243. See id. at 202; see also Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277 (O'Connor, J., con-
curring) ("[Sltray remarks in the workplace . . . cannot justify requiring the employer
to prove that its hiring or promotion decisions were based on legitimate criteria. Nor
can statements by non-decisionmakers, or statements by decisionmakers unrelated to
the decisional process itself, suffice to satisfy the plaintiffs burden in this regard").
guidance as to what evidence is necessary for a plaintiff to withstand a
defendant employer's motion for summary judgment.
3. Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the granting of
summary judgment if there are no genuine issues of material fact or law
present in the case. 4 In order to avoid the granting of a summary
judgment motion, the adverse party must respond and set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.24 In deciding a mo-
tion for summary judgment, the district court should remember that all
evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed and that the court must
view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.246 The
judge's inquiry is to determine whether there is more than a scintilla of
evidence upon which a jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.4 If
such evidence exists, there is a genuine issue of fact that requires a tri-
al.
2 48
In a McDonnell Douglas model case, a defendant employer is likely to
move for summary judgment, particularly given the failure by the St.
Mary's majority to address What type of evidence is necessary to prove
the ultimate issue of discrimination. The basis for the motion will rarely
be the alleged nonexistence of the prima facie case. Rather, the defen-
dant will likely introduce evidence via affidavit or deposition of a legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action. Prior to St.
Mary's, pretext-plus courts routinely granted summary judgment for
employers on the basis that, while the plaintiff may have raised a fact
issue or even proven falsity of the employer's proffered reason, the plain-
tiff had no additional evidence of animus. This is tantamount to a re-
244. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Rule 56(c) states that summary judgment may be
granted if 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law." Id.
245. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Rule 56(e) states:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in
this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials
of the adverse party's pleadings, but the adverse party's response, by affida-
vits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts show-
ing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the ad-
verse party.
Id.
246. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
247. Id. at 248.
248. Id. at 257.
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quirement for direct evidence which, by definition, does not exist in a
circumstantial disparate treatment case.
However, in St. Mary's, Justice Scalia explicitly provided ammunition
for a plaintiff to withstand an employer's motion for summary judgment,
stating that:
The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly
if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the
elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination. Thus,
rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons, will permit the trier of fact to infer
the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination, and the Court of Appeals was cor-
rect when it noted that, upon such rejection, "no additional proof of discrimina-
tion is required.""
Justice Scaiia's remarks logically lead to this result: raising a genuine
issue of fact regarding the credibility of the employer's proffered reasons
should defeat the employer's motion for summary judgment. The resolu-
tion of the factual issue of Whether the employer's reasons are true is
material to the ultimate determination of whether the employer intention-
ally discriminated against the plaintiff. The Supreme Court has defined a
material fact as one that affects the outcome of the case.2" The cre-
ation of a genuine issue of material fact on the issue should preclude
summary judgment because the issue of falsity of the employer's reason
might affect the outcome of the case.
Clearly, it is within the fact finder's province to determine disputed
issues, namely, whether the employer's proffered reason is credible and,
ultimately, whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the
plaintiff." In determining the employer's state of mind, it is crucial that
the fact finder have the opportunity to assess the credibility of the
witnesses' testimony and to observe their demeanor. The district judge
must not usurp the role of the fact finder in determining the credibility
and weight of statements. 2 The factual inquiry in a pretext case re-
249. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2749 (1993) (citation omitted).
250. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 ("[Substantive law will identify which facts are
material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.")
251. See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (a district court's
finding of discriminatory intent in an action brought under Title VII is a factual find-
ing).
252. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 ("Credibility determinations, the weighing of the
evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions,
not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for
a directed verdict.").
mains the determination of the intent of the defendant at the time of the
alleged discriminatory action. This inquiry, dependent in large part upon
the credibility of the parties, is not readily disposed of by summary judg-
ment.
Undoubtedly, the ultimate issue of whether the defendant intentionally
discriminated is a fact issue for the jury. Because a fact finder may infer
discrimination from the prima facie case and proof of falsity, summary
judgment cannot be granted for the employer when the plaintiff estab-
lishes the prima facie case and raises a fact issue on the employer's artic-
ulated reasons.
In support of this conclusion, in Shager v. Upjohn Co.,' Judge
Posner stated:
If the only reason an employer offers for firing an employee is a lie, the inference
that the reason was a forbidden one, such as age, may rationally be drawn. This is
the common sense behind the rule of McDonnell Douglas. It is important to un-
derstand, however, that the inference is not compelled. The trier of fact must
decide after a trial whether to draw the inference. The lie may be concealing a
reason that is shameful or stupid but not proscribed, in which event there is no
liability .... The point is only that if the inference of improper motive can be
drawn, there must be a trial.'
Judge Posner thus agrees with Justice Scalia's remarks in that the dis-
crediting of the employer's reason does create an inference of discrimina-
tion, which may lead to a finding of discrimination.
Judge Posner's logic would seem to dictate the following domino ef-
fect. If a fact issue exists on whether the employer's articulated reason is
credible, then the plaintiff should be entitled to a jury trial."5 However,
this conclusion begs the issue of what type of evidence will create such
a fact issue. The decision belongs to the trial judge who will rule on the
employer's motion for summary judgment. Unfortunately, lower courts'
decisions regarding the probative value of evidence are far from uniform
and often seem to turn on the individual proclivities of a given judge.as
253. 913 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1990).
254. Id. at 401. In Shager, the Seventh Circuit reversed the lower court which had
granted summary judgment to the employer. Id. at 399. On the other hand, Judge
Posner wrote in another case that "the workload of the federal courts, and realization
that Title VII is occasionally or perhaps more than occasionally used by plaintiffs as
a substitute for principles of job protection that do not yet exist in American law,
have led the courts to take a critical look at efforts to withstand defendants' motions
for summary judgment." Palucki v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 879 F.2d 1568, 1572 (7th
Cir. 1989).
255. Of course, .even if the plaintiff proves pretext at trial, judgment for the plaintiff
is not compelled. That is the majority holding in St. Mary's. It is possible that a
plaintiff may prove the employer's reason is pretextual but that a jury might not find
that it was a pretext for discrimination.
256. There are numerous difficulties involved in determining whether circumstantial
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In the recent pretext-plus Fifth Circuit case of Moore v. Eli Lilly &
Co.," the employer made a number of comments from which a fact
finder could infer discriminatory animus based on age sufficient to create
a genuine issue of fact concerning the falsity of the employer's proffered
reason. The comments at issue included:
1. A series of questions by a supervisor concerning the ages of the cur-
rent employees and whether they were going to retire soon;'s
2. A comment made by a supervisor to the plaintiff that if he were in
plaintiffs position, he would be out "seeing the world;" "
3. A comment made by a supervisor to the plaintiff while both were in
the restroom that "he sure had a strong stream for an old man;"26
and
4. Comments made by other supervisors to the plaintiff not to recom-
mend people over thirty-five years of age for new sales positions.26 '
In affirming summary judgment for the employer, however, the Fifth
Circuit held that these comments, as well as other evidence, did not
establish a nexus between the plaintiffs age and his termination so as to
create a genuine issue of fact concerning pretext.262 This requirement of
a "nexus" is wholly misplaced in the context of circumstantial evidence.
The Fifth Circuit has confused direct evidence, which typically requires
an evidentiary link between the discriminatory animus and the chal-
lenged decision, with circumstantial evidence. Any type of evidence
which casts doubt on the employer's proffered explanation should suffice
to defeat an employer's motion for summary judgment. The evidence
need not in and of itself show discrimination. Rather, it need only cast
doubt on the employer's story. A genuine factual dispute regarding the
evidence has probative value. As one evidence treatise states:
[Hiow can a judge know whether the evidence could reasonably affect an
assessment of the probability of the fact to be inferred? In some instances,
scientific research may show that the fact in issue is more likely to be true
(or false) when such evidence is present than when it is not. Ordinarily,
however, the answer must lie in the judge's own experience, general knowl-
edge, and understanding of human conduct and motivation.
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 221, at 778.
257. 990 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1993).
258. Id. at 817.
259. Id. at 818.
260. Id. at 818 n.28.
261. Id. at 818.
262. Id. at 817, 819.
credibility of the employer's articulated reasons is a factual dispute
which a fact finder should resolve. In so doing, the fact finder may deter-
mine that the true reason for the action was discrimination. The U.S.
Supreme Court has reiterated that at the summary judgment level "the
judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the
truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for
trial."263
In addition, the Fifth Circuit in Moore violated the rule that "on motion
for summary judgment, the ambiguities in a witness's testimony must be
resolved against the moving party."" As one Seventh Circuit opinion
put it, "[T]he task of disambiguating ambiguous utterances is for trial,
not for summary judgment."2 " Instead, the Fifth Circuit improperly in-
ferred legitimate purposes behind the first three statements and stated
that the fourth comment was merely "'pottie humor.''""
The Fifth Circuit also discounted evidence regarding inconsistencies in
the employer's articulated reason for termination.28 The Court held that
"while the conflicting accounts indicate a factual dispute as to exactly
how Moore was terminated, their existence does not provide direct (or
even indirect) proof that he was fired because of age."" The court re-
fused to acknowledge that the inconsistencies in the employer's prof-
fered reasons for the termination might allow a fact finder to infer that
the employer was attempting, inartfully, to cover up discrimination.
Other types of evidence should also raise a factual issue as to the
falsity of the employer's stated reason. As suggested in McDonnell Doug-
las, evidence of comparative treatment of the plaintiff6 and statistical
263. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986).
264. See, e.g., Binder v. Long Island Lighting Co., 933 F.2d 187, 191 (2d Cir. 1991).
265. Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 402 (7th Cir. 1990).
266. Moore v. Eli Lilly & Co., 990 F.2d 812, 818 (5th Cir. 1993).
267. Id. at 819.
268. Id.
269. The majority opinion in St. Mary's does not discuss the probative value of evi-
dence of differential treatment. However, Justice Scalia's hostility toward its probative
value is revealed in Carter v. Duncan-Huggins, Ltd., 727 F.2d 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
which was decided while Justice Scalia was still a member of the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit. In an adamant dissent against the majority's
finding of discrimination, Judge Scalia maintained that evidence of differential treat-
ment does not constitute evidence of discrimination. Id. at 1239 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing). In Carter, the plaintiff, the first and only black employee of a company, pro-
duced evidence at trial that she had been treated differently than white employees.
Id. at 1239-47. Judge Scalia stated, "The majority's analysis of the evidence involves a
basic error of law-that evidence of differential treatment constitutes evidence of
racial motivation for differential treatment." Id. at 1239 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He
elaborated by stating that the numerous pieces of circumstantial evidence of differen-
tial treatment "are not circumstantial evidence of racial motivation, but only (if they
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evidence revealing disparities relating to the protected classifications
may assist the plaintiff in proving pretext.27 Because this type of evi-
dence assists a plaintiff in proving pretext, it should also assist a plaintiff
in defeating an employer's motion for summary judgment and, in some
cases, in supporting a jury's finding of discrimination. Although proving
the falsity of the employer's reasons is subsumed into proving the ulti-
mate issue of discrimination, the existence of a fact issue on the credibil-
ity of the employer's proffered explanation entitles the plaintiff to a jury.
However, raising a genuine issue of fact as to the credibility of the
defendant's proffered reason may require more than just the plaintiffs
conclusory affidavit that the articulated reason is false.27" ' The Supreme
were established) of an intent to disfavor [plaintiff]. That is not against the law." Id.
at 1246 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia's comments directly contradict the edict in International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), where the Supreme Court described
disparate treatment cases as those where "[tihe employer simply treats some people
less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex or national ori-
gin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be
inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment." Id. at 335 n.15. Justice
Scalia's position that differential treatment provides no probative evidence of discrimi-
nation is simply incorrect. Probative value should be given to comparative and statis-
tical evidence. A plaintiff must have the opportunity to prove his case circum-
stantially as mandated by the Supreme Court. See United States Postal Serv. Bd. Of
Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 n.3 (1983) ("As in any lawsuit, the plaintiff
may prove his case by direct or circumstantial evidence. The trier of fact should
consider all the evidence, giving it whatever weight and credence it deserves.")
270. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973). The First Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals issued a recent decision regarding the use of statistics which is
akin to the Fifth Circuit's misplaced requirement of a nexus between the proffered
pretext evidence and the discrimination. See LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d
836 (Ist Cir. 1993). In LeBlanc, the First Circuit stated that there was "no evidence
whatsoever to connect the statistics to Great American's specific decision to dismiss
LeBlanc." Id. at 840. Again, such a nexus requirement is wholly inapplicable to cir-
cumstantial statistical evidence. The First Circuit is transposing direct evidence causa-
tion requirements onto circumstantial cases.
As one Fifth Circuit case has recognized, there may be some individual circum-
stantial cases in which the statistical evidence of discrimination is so compelling that
the statistical evidence alone would suffice to prove discrimination. Walther v. Lone
Star Gas Co., 977 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1992). In dictum, the court recognized that prov-
ing discriminatory intent "by statistics alone would be a challenging endeavor." Id.
Nonetheless, the court did not preclude the possibility. Id.
271. See Rossy v. Roche Prod., Inc., 880 F.2d 621, 624 (Ist Cir. 1989) (holding that
summary judgment may be appropriate if the non-moving party rests merely upon
conclusory allegation, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation).
Court has stated that the "nonmovant may not rest upon the mere allega-
tions or denials of his pleading, but.., must set forth specific facts
showing there is a genuine issue for trial."2 On the other hand, as the
Supreme Court stated in Burdine, "[T]here may be some cases where the
plaintiffs initial evidence, combined with effective cross-examination of
the defendant, will suffice to discredit the defendant's explanation."'
This would suggest that a plaintiff with no circumstantial evidence of
discrimination other than the prima facie case (such as statistics, differ-
ential treatment, or classification-related remarks) should not attempt to
rely solely on a conclusory affidavit. Instead, the plaintiff should oppose
the motion by providing deposition testimony of the cross-examination of
defense witnesses. It may be possible through deposition cross-examina-
tion to create an issue of fact as to the credibility of the proffered rea-
son, whereas a conclusory affidavit alone probably would not be compe-
tent summary judgment evidence.274
The district judge who is grappling with whether to grant or deny an
employer's motion for summary judgment will find little guidance from
pretext-plus precedent from lower courts. Unlike the St. Mary's majority,
these courts took an extreme view of the plaintiffs evidentiary burden in
a circumstantial case. Summary judgment opinions from most lower
pretext-plus courts required far more than the creation of a fact issue on
the employer's articulated reason. For example, in Villanueva v.
Wellesley College, 5 the First Circuit stated that the plaintiff "must do
more than cast doubt on the wisdom of the employer's justification; to
defeat summary judgment the plaintiff must introduce evidence that the
real reason for the employer's action was discrimination."' In the First
Circuit's view, in order to create a dispute of material fact, a discrimina-
tion plaintiff must raise an inference of discriminatory motive underlying
the pretextual explanation."277 Under this view, the "mere showing that
the employer's articulated reason may shield another (possibly nondis-
criminatory) reason does not create a dispute of material fact."27 In
other words, even a plaintiff who can prove that the proffered reasons
272. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
273. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 n.10 (1983).
274. See, e.g., Little v. Republic Ref. Co., 924 F.2d 93, 96 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding
that an age discrimination plaintiff's own good faith belief that her age motivated her
employer's action is of little value); Laurence v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 885 F.2d 280,
285 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that conclusory statements of age discrimination cannot
support an inference that the defendant violated the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act).
275. 930 F.2d 124 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 181 (1981).
276. Id. at 127-28.
277. Id. at 128.
278. Id.
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are false, not just raise a fact issue, cannot withstand the employer's
motion for summary judgment.
The First Circuit's approach, however, is flawed. It is a material fact as
to whether the employer's reason is credible, as proof of falsity together
with the prima facie case could support a factfinder's determination of
discrimination.' As a whole, pre-St. Mary's pretext-plus cases provide
no instruction to the trial judge who is contemplating whether to grant
or deny an employer's motion for summary judgment. In many of these
decisions, summary judgment was granted and affirmed for the employer
on the basis that the employee, while creating a fact issue on the credi-
bility of the employer's proffered explanation, failed to adduce additional
evidence of discriminatory animus.' This requirement, which is tanta-
mount to mandating that a plaintiff possess direct evidence of discrimi-
nation in order to survive an employer's motion for summary judgment,
clearly runs counter to the majority's directive in St. Mary's.
In the few months since St. Mary's was decided, several lower courts
have relied heavily on St. Mary's "ammunition" language. In each of
three district court cases, the court denied the employer's motion for
summary judgment because the plaintiff created a material issue of fact
regarding the falsity of the employer's proffered reason." In each case,
the court cited the "ammunition" language to find that the plaintiff was
entitled to a jury trial.' Thus, at least some lower courts appear to be
279. The First Circuit Court itself is split as to whether a discrimination plaintiff
must adduce evidence beyond that comprising the prima facie case and the rebuttal
of the defendant's justification in order to prevail either at the summary judgment
stage or at trial. See Connell v. Bank of Boston, 924 F.2d 1169, 1172 n.3 (1st Cir.)
(holding that no' such additional evidence is required; evidence when taken as a
whole "must be sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to infer that the employer's de-
cision was motivated by" discriminatory animus), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2828 (1991).
But see Olivera v. Nestle Puerto Rico, Inc., 922 F.2d 43, 48 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding
that a plaintiff must adduce additional evidence).
280. See, e.g., Menard v. First Sec. Serv. Corp., 848 F.2d 281 (1st Cir. 1988) (affirm-
ing summary judgment for employer despite evidence that cast substantial doubt on
the employer's reasons for firing the employee).
281. Malone v. Signal Processing Technologies, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 370 (D.C. Colo.
1993); Daniels v. Runyon, No. 91 Civ. 4823, 1993 WL 269621 (E.D.N.Y. July 8, 1993);
Reiff v. Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, 827 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
282. Malone, 826 F. Supp. at 374-75 (holding that the employer's articulated reason
for discharge was rebutted by testimony that employer had enormous volume of
work and anticipated hiring 191 employees within the next five years); Daniels, 1993
WL 269621 at *7 (ruling that the employer's articulated reason for failure to promote
an African-American plaintiff was rebutted by plaintiff's proof of both better creden-
interpreting the ammunition language to preclude employers' summary
judgments when the plaintiff can raise an issue of fact as to the falsity of
the employer's articulated nondiscriminatory reasons.
In addition, an argument can be made that under St. Mary's, all a
plaintiff need do to defeat an employer's motion for summary judgment
is establish a prima facie case. A recent California appellate decision,
Moisi v. College of the Sequoias Community College District,' relied
on St. Mary's ammunition language to reverse a lower court's grant of
summary judgment for the employer. The court's reversal was not based
on the creation of a fact issue as to falsity of the proffered reason.
Rather, the court concluded that a plaintiff who establishes a prima facie
case is entitled to a trial to determine the credibility of the employer's
proffered reason.' The court stated that:
[A]n employer's [action]... at the summary judgment stage does not remove the
issue of credibility. Under the rule in St. Mary's, even though an employer has
come forward with legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for discrimination which
have not been specifically rebutted by the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to a full
and fair opportunity to demonstrate, through the presentation of her own case
and through cross-examination of the employer's witnesses, that the reasons prof-
fered are not the true reasons for the challenged action but that an unlawful dis-
criminatory reason is.
We recognize that the holding and analysis in St. Mary's, as we understand
it, will preclude summary judgment in most employment discrimination cases,
at least in those where the employee has established a prima facie case and there
are no 'legal defenses (such as failure to comply with statutory prerequisites or file
within the applicable statute of limitations) available to the employer. Nonethe-
less, in California we have consistently reserved summary judgment for those
cases in which there exists no triable issue of fact and in which the moving party
can demonstrate an entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Credibility issues
may not be resolved at summary judgment but are left to the trier of fact. If ap-
pellant has established a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, she is enti-
tled to challenge the credibility of respondent's proffered reasons for terminating
her and for refusing to rehire her at trial.
Thus, the court concluded that the truthfulness of the proffered non-
discriminatory reasons of the employer is an issue for the trier of
tials than white person hired and nepotistic practices at a facility staffed and man-
aged predominantly by whites); Retff, 827 F. Supp. at 321 (stating that the desire to
eliminate the least productive employees, the employer's articulated reason for dis-
charge, was rebutted by testimony that discharged plaintiff had received excellent
evaluations in her 34 years with the employer).
283. 19 Cal. App. 4th 564 (1993). The case involved the construction of the Cali-
fornia Fair Employment and Housing Act, an act which parallels Title VII and uses
the same models of proof. Id.
284. Id. at 575-76.
285. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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fact. '6 As the court stated, this view precludes summary judgment in
most discrimination cases. 7 This view comports with Burdine's state-
ment that "there may be some cases where the plaintiffs initial evidence,
combined with effective cross-examination of the defendant, will suffice
to discredit the defendant's explanation."' The analysis is also but-
tressed by Justice Scalia's statement that the rebuttal of the prima facie
case by the defendant involves no credibility assessment of the proffered
reason.
2 W
However, the Moisi court ignores basic summary judgment rules. A
plaintiff cannot withstand summary judgment unless he or she produces
evidence sufficient to create an issue of fact.'8 The analysis in Moisi
would allow a plaintiff to ignore this burden of production and proceed
to trial when he or she has offered no evidence that could possibly con-
trovert the defendant's justification."8 The standard adopted in Moisi is
much lower than that used for civil plaintiffs in other areas of the law.
Forcing almost every defendant in a discrimination case to trial is too ex-
treme and is an entr6e for abuse of the process. The California court's
view ignores summary judgment rules and gives too much strength to a
plaintiffs establishment of a prima facie case, which is typically a light
burden for a plaintiff. Nonetheless, this view and the more moderate
view which relies on the "ammunition" language provide two interpreta-
tions of St. Mary's which work to preclude an employer's motion for
summary judgment. In the few months since St. Mary's decision was
issued, some courts have found these constructions persuasive in holding
that the respective plaintiffs were entitled to jury trials on their claims of
discrimination.
If a plaintiff withstands an employer's motion for summary judgment
and proceeds to trial on the merits before a jury, the impact of St.
Mary's should be negligible. At trial, if a plaintiff proves that an
employer's proffered reason for its actions is false, most jurors will logi-
cally infer that the proffered reason is a cover-up for discrimination.
Otherwise, the employer would simply have told the true reason for the
action. As Justice Souter noted in his dissent, "'[C]ommon experience'
286. Id. at 576.
287. Id.
288. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.10 (1983).
289. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2748 (1993).
290. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
291. See Bolton v. Scrivener, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 783 (W.D. Okla. 1993) (criticizing
Moisi).
tells us that it is 'more likely than not' that the employer who lies is
simply trying to cover up the illegality alleged by the plaintiff." 2 Thus,
the majority's assertion that proof of falsity of the employer's explana-
tion does not compel judgment for the plaintiff normally should not
cause a difference in the outcome of most jury trials.
Thus, while the majority in St. Mary's may have wished to see an in-
crease in summary judgments to reduce the case backlog of most federal
courts, the decision should not result in a flood of employer summary
judgment victories. Under the majority's explicit language and unique
view of the pretext-plus model, most circumstantial cases still must be
tried by a jury. These disputes are factually-intensive and simply do not
lend themselves to summary disposition. As one Fifth Circuit case stated,
"[D]eterminations regarding motivation and intent depend on complicat-
ed inferences from the evidence and are therefore peculiarly within the
province of the factfinder.""3
While not a panacea, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms such.
as mediation may help to provide needed relief for the overloaded feder-
al courts. In addition, many employers are now requiring their employees
to agree to submit any employment disputes, including claims of discrim-
ination, to binding arbitration. In an emerging line of cases, several lower
courts have held that an employer may elect to require their employees
to enter into very specific arbitration agreements, committing the em-
ployees to arbitrate employment-related disputes, including discrimina-
tion claims. 4 In addition, other types of dispute resolution techniques
may be utilized in discrimination cases, including mediation, moderated
settlement conferences, mini-trials, and summary jury trials. In summary,
the solution to the backlog in the federal courts cannot and should not
be the knee-jerk granting of employers' summary judgment motions.
Such a short-sighted "solution" would result in the wholesale decimation
of circumstantial discrimination cases and lead to further discriminatory
abuse in the workplace.
292. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2763 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Fumco Constr.
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
293. Thornbrough v. Columbus & G.R.R., 760 F.2d 633, 641 (5th Cir. 1975).
294. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (ruling that
ADEA claims can be subjected to compulsory arbitration); Scott v. Farm Family Life
Ins. Co., 827 F. Supp. 76 (D. Mass. 1993) (applying Gilmer retroactively and holding
that plaintiff must arbitrate sex discrimination charge). Whether as a matter of policy
these arbitration agreements should bind discrimination claimants to an arbitral fo-
rum, thus depriving them of the right to a jury, is beyond the scope of this Article.
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V. PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO OVERRIDE ST. MARY'S
A little more than one month after St. Mary's was decided, legislation
to override the decision was introduced in Congress. The proposed legis-
lation, entitled the "Employment Discrimination Evidentiary Amendment
Act of 1993,"29 is a partisan bill, currently co-sponsored by 26 Demo-
crats and no Republicans. It reads as follows:
Section 706 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5) is amended by
adding at the end the following:
"O)(1) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate treatment is estab-
lished if-
"(A) the complaining party proves by a preponderance of the evidence a prima
facie case that the respondent engaged in such practice; and
"(B) either-
"(i) the respondent fails to produce any evidence to rebut such case; or
"(ii)(I) the respondent articulates, and produces evidence of, one or more
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the conduct alleged to be the unlaw-
ful employment practice; and
"(I1) the complaining party demonstrates that each of such reasons is not
true, but a pretext for discrimination that is the unlawful employment practice.
"(2) Paragraph (1) shall not be construed to specify the only mean by which an
unlawful employment practice based on disparate treatment may be estab-
lished."'
The proposed legislation obviously seeks to return the McDonnell
Douglas model to the pretext-only form. The intent of the legislation is to
equate proof of pretext with proof of discrimination and thus compel
judgment for the plaintiff. However, the wording of the legislation is
problematic and may not accomplish its apparent goal. Section
(1)(B)(ii)(II) quoted above states that a plaintiff will prevail by proving
that the employer's proffered reasons are "not true but a pretext for
discrimination that is the unlawful employment practice." The itali-
cized portion of the language should be omitted from the legislation to
unambiguously override St. Mary's; otherwise, some courts likely will
conclude that additional evidence beyond proof of falsity is still mandat-
ed by the legislation."
295. H.R. 2787, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
296. Id.
297. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of the distinc-
tion some courts make between proving "pretext" and "pretext for discrimination," the
latter requiring evidence beyond proof of falsity of the employer's articulated reason.
Hence, reference to "pretext for discrimination" in the proposed legislation gives
These same courts-ones which may be predisposed to ignore St.
Mary's ammunition language-may also conclude that proof of falsity of
the proffered reason (much less a fact issue as to falsity) does not raise
a genuine issue of material fact as to discrimination at the summary
judgment stage. Hence, it is critical that the legislation be revised to omit
the ambiguous language. simply putting a period after the word "true" in
section (1)(B)(ii)(II) would easily solve the ambiguity and clearly enunci-
ate the pure pretext-only view.
Assuming the offending language is deleted, another crucial issue is
not addressed by the legislation: What type of evidence will create a fact
issue as to falsity of the proffered reason? As discussed earlier,
McDonnell Douglas itself listed several types of pretext evidence, includ-
ing evidence that similarly situated employees (not of plaintiffs protected
classification) were treated differently than the plaintiff, evidence of
prior treatment of the plaintiff, or statistical evidence revealing dispari-
ties relating to the protected classification of the plaintiff." The Court
later clarified that pretext evidence is not limited to certain types but
may take a variety of forms.' Unfortunately, and perhaps predictably,
as this Article has pointed out, courts vary widely in their interpretation
of the probative value of pretext evidence at the summary judgment
stage. In application, this means that whether an individual plaintiff can
withstand an employer's summary judgment motion and obtain a jury
trial depends largely on the proclivities of a given trial judge. Of course,
the issue of whether legislation can address this seemingly intractable
issue is debatable. A non-exhaustive listing of the types of evidence from
which a jury could infer falsity might be useful to trial judges. However,
such a listing would be imprecise as evidence varies so widely from case
to case.
One major omission from the legislation in its current form is its fail-
ure to address the issue of retroactivity, that is, whether it applies to
pending claims or cases. The failure of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to
address this same issue was a serious omission and resulted in a legisla-
tive punt back to the courts to resolve the issue. However, the omission
was perhaps the result of a political compromise. The issue has finally
worked its way up to the Supreme Court, and the decision will presum-
ably clarify the guidelines for determining the retroactivity of legislation
when the legislation is silent." Therefore, in order to avoid the quag-
mire surrounding the issue of whether the Civil Rights Act of 1991 is
these courts an opportunity to construe the legislation in a pretext-plus fashion.
298. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973).
299. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187 (1989).
300. See supra note 18.
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retroactive, the proposed legislation overriding St. Mary's should be
amended to address the retroactivity issue explicitly.
In summary, Congress should take a careful look at the cases emerging
post-St. Mary's to determine whether the impact of St. Mary's truly mer-
its this pro-plaintiff legislation. If lower courts consistently utilize the
"ammunition" language provided by the majority in overruling employers'
motions for summary judgment, the effects of properly drafted legislation
would be negligible. On the other hand, if lower courts utilize St. Mary's
to authorize the routine granting of employer summary judgments, re-
vised legislation should be advanced so as to allow factfmders the oppor-
tunity to decide whether discrimination has occurred.
VI. CONCLUSION
An inherent tension pervades discrimination law: the need for equal
opportunity in the workplace versus the need for business to exercise
legitimate business judgment without the coercive fear of discrimination
lawsuits. As a whole, the Supreme Court and Congress have taken differ-
ent philosophical approaches to issues surrounding discrimination cases,
approaches which often affect the outcome of similar cases.
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, in its majority and dissenting opin-
ions, reflects the evidentiary difficulties involved in circumstantially prov-
ing that an employer intended to discriminate. But while the majority
opinion indubitably precluded the compelling of judgment for a plaintiff
who proves an employer's articulated reason false, it arguably should
have little further effect on the ability of employees to pursue their
claims before a jury. The decision, via the explicit language of the ma-
jority, should not result in a landslide of employer summary judgments.
On the contrary, via the Court's language and the inherent nature of
circumstantial cases, most cases must be resolved by juries.
Before enacting overriding legislation, pro-civil rights leaders should
carefully examine the impact of St. Mary's by studying lower courts'
interpretations of the Court's decision. Piecemeal legislation should be
enacted only in response to decisions which truly constrict the ability of
plaintiffs to pursue discrimination cases.

